Preface

By John D. French (Interim Director of Undergraduate Studies)

It is my pleasure to welcome a new issue of Historia Nova, the undergraduate history journal of Duke University where I serve as Director of Undergraduate Studies. Nova offers yet more proof of the vibrant intellectual life among undergraduate students interested in history in universities across the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. As with the prior issues, the editorial team has assembled a splendid potpourri of articles which encompass radically different worlds and an array of methodologically and thematic foci.

My words of welcome also come in a very special year in which an unprecedented seventeen Duke’s history majors successfully completed honors theses, assisted by thirteen faculty advisors and our thesis seminar director Simon Partner, incoming as interim chair of the History. As we peruse this issue, I turn for inspiration to the words of the celebrated English novelist of Thomas Cromwell, Hilary Mantel, who summed up the historian’s mission in her 2017 BBC Reith Lecture:

Evidence is always partial. Facts are not truth, though they are part of it—information is not knowledge. And history is not the past—it is the method we have evolved of organizing our ignorance of the past. It’s the record of what’s left on the record. . It’s what’s left in the sieve when the centuries run through it—a few stones, scraps of writing, scraps of cloth. It is no more ‘the past’ than a birth certificate is a birth, or a script is a performance, or a map is a journey. It is the multiplication of the evidence of fallible and biased witnesses, combined with incomplete accounts of actions not fully understood by the people who performed them. It’s no more the past that the best we can do, and often it falls short of that.¹

Dear Reader,

We are proud to present Historia Nova’s Spring 2022 Issue.

This season, we received over one hundred submissions, a record number for our journal. After carefully perusing an astoundingly diverse range of papers—hailing from a myriad of universities across the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada—we selected six to publish. These articles were chosen for their cogency of argument, rigor of research, and above all, their embodiment of Historia Nova’s founding ethos: the writing of new histories.

History is often misperceived as an unimaginative review of a frozen past. In response, our journal has sought to illuminate the dynamism of historical scholarship. Indeed, the field is perpetually evolving with creative reinter-pretations of traditional narratives, inventive re-evaluations of established perspectives, and rebellious reconfig-urations of canonical corpora. As such, the field of history is a never-drying clay, a living and breathing body of knowledge that is incessantly questioned and interrogated to be cyclically made anew. Predicated on the unique insights of each historian, the discipline of history will forever metamorphosize to the idiosyncratic rhythms and intellectual fingerprints of each new generation of scholars.

In this issue, we feature a critical examination of 17th century Spanish cartography vis-à-vis indigenous Quechua map-making practices—regarding the reinforcement of and resistance to the colonization process. Continuing with colonial studies, the next paper inspects the extent to which the anti-colonial struggle surrounding the partition of South Asia impacted the Pashtun people. Returning to the Western Hemisphere, the following essay elucidates the role of feminist activists within the ‘Chicanismo’ movement of Mexican Americans. Moving back to the Indian Subcontinent, the subsequent article investigates the cultural hybridity underpinning the legitima-tion of Mughal rule during the early modern period. Penultimately, we present an inquisitive study of the moti-ves of the United States in the coordination of the Guatemalan Coup of 1954. Finally, staying in the Americas, this issue concludes with a cogent analysis of the norms of ritualistic mourning in 19th-century Latin American culture—and how such social, cultural, and religious expectations specifically affected women.

We would like to extend our deepest gratitude to each and every one of our editors for their hard work and commitment to the highest standards, to the faculty members and graduate students who have supported this publication with their expertise and guidance, and last but certainly not least, to the authors of these outstanding papers, upon whose genius and creative scholarship our journal depends.

Sincerely,
The Historia Nova Editorial Board

Our Mission

Historia Nova features exceptional historical analysis from undergraduate students at institutions across the United States and around the world. Our publication reveals the field’s dynamism and challenges the ways in which history is interpreted and continually re-interpreted by scholars. We hope you enjoy this Spring Volume. For more information about our organization at Duke University please refer to our website at (https://history.duke.edu/new-events/undergraduate) or email us at (dukehistorianova@gmail.com).
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The Spanish picota was the literal and symbolic pillar of justice at the heart of the colonial Peruvian town. Depicted as a stone column in the classical style on maps and envisioned as such in the Iberian imaginary, the physical embodiment of Christian urbanity and order—policia, as the Spanish would have called it—was in reality often nothing more than a small tree. Organic, not marble; decaying, not eternal. The colonial process was as much about the symbolic and the imagined as it was about the logistical and physical. Messaging, subliminal and overt, about the justifications for and efficacy of the colonial process fueled a wider war against indigenous ways of life and thinking. Through looking at both Spanish and Quechua maps, this paper seeks to examine the ways in which cartographic expressions of colonial space reinforced the colonial project—as well as offered a means of resistance.

In order to compare and contrast the geographic and cartographic imagination of the Spanish colonizer with that found in indigenous Andean populations, two different late 16th century maps will be used. As an exemplar of imperial Spanish mapmaking, as well as Spanish cartographic thinking, a c.1575 map by chronicler-cosmographer Juan López de Velasco (which was first published in 1601 as a part of Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas’ massive work referred to by scholars as Décadas) entitled “Descripción de las Yndias Occidentales” will be used. For an indigenous perspective, a map created by the highly educated Quechua nobleman Felipe Wamán Poma de Ayala in 1615, “Mapa Mvndi del Reino de las In[di]as,” as a part of his much studied Nueva corónica y buen gobierno, will be used. The type of historical analysis pursued in this paper would not be possible without borrowing theoretical and methodological insights from the nascent field of critical cartography. It will be assumed, from a theoretical standpoint, that a map is a visual representation of the agenda and world view of the map’s creator as well as an influential societal informant through its reproduction of unequal power relations. As Sletto. et al puts it bluntly, “Cartography has a troubled history as a technology of power. The production and distribution of maps, often understood to be ideological representations that support the interests of their developers, have

1 López de Velasco Juan, Descripción de las Yndias Occidentales, Fold-out Engraved Map, 37 cm. by 28 cm. (Madrid: En la Emplenta Real, 1601), JCB Map Collection, The John Carter Brown Library. See figure 1. 
2 I have defaulted to the new orthography common in Peru since the 70s and 80s that spells Quechua words with the standardized Quechua alphabet devised in the late 20th century. ‘Hu’ becomes ‘w,’ ‘ć’ often becomes ‘k’ or sometimes ‘q’ depending on the word. 
3 Guaman Poma, Mapa Mvndi Del Reino de Las In[Di]As, 1615, Drawing, 1615, Nueva corónica y buen gobierno, 983-984 [1001-1002], Det Kongelige Bibliotek. See figure 2.
served as tools of colonization.” From a methodological standpoint, the paper will seek to undermine the commonly held belief that maps are value-free, objective descriptions of the world via the postmodern project of deconstruction. A map can be deconstructed once the map itself is understood to be textual. Geographer and historian of maps J.B. Harley describes this methodology of cartographic deconstruction as one that “... urges us to read between the lines of the map—‘in the margins of the text’—and through its tropes to discover the silences and contradictions that challenge the apparent honesty of the image.”

Historians operating under these theoretical assumptions and adopting the methodology of deconstruction find themselves employing various shades of critical theory; something that should be done thoughtfully and with good reason. There are, of course, limitations to this approach, and the researcher should clearly state what cannot be assumed by the reader. Addressing potential methodological concerns, it should be said that there are very few treatises written about mapmaking surviving from the period, and it would be wishful thinking to claim that any sort of historical text outlining a definitive Spanish “cartographic imaginary” exists. Thus, any statements about the intentions or thinking of colonial cartographers drawn from the primary materials are merely suppositions guided by a certain theoretical orientation and agenda. We will look first to the idea of the Spanish cartographic imaginary as understood within my theoretical framework. This “cartographic imaginary” works in two complementary directions. The first meaning of the imaginary is akin to any sort of collective consciousness, consisting of widely held beliefs that help to define a social body, but with special attention in this case to the ways that a society thinks about space, territory, and geography. The abstract nature of these conceptions is accentuated when discussing far-flung, colonial geographies. Lack of firsthand experience is remedied by powerful, essentializing portraits of “exotic” peoples and landscapes. A reductive understanding of complex, unfamiliar worlds led to the distillation of otherized spaces into a singular, easily digestible notion of “colonized” places. In this way, the collective understanding of removed geographies was more uniform than the multifaceted ways of conceptualizing one’s immediate space. While every day entails a new interaction with local landscape, the Iberian Peninsula was left with the same rudimentary view of the Americas manifested in only a handful of maps.

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The second meaning of the “cartographic imaginary” is the intentional, highly particular way that mapmakers choose to depict space through specific cartographic choices. It is the way that the cartographer, as much an artist as a scientist, best imagines the object of observation or measurement translated through his constructed world of iconography, markings, inscriptions, lines, glosses, and images. In this sense, the cartographic imaginary is both the language and setting of a subtly profound act of storytelling. As was discussed earlier, this story is one that masquerades as dry and technical. A veneer of mathematical delineation and cartographic science seemingly confirms its veracity and puts the map in a category of objects beyond rebuke or subjective analysis. Cartographic imagination can subsequently be a clever tool of colonization that establishes a dominant view of the world while simultaneously messaging neutrality and—in the case of the western epistemological tradition—an irreproachable, positivist brand of truth.

David Buissieret has written that the 16th century Spanish viewed the colonies as a unified, Castilian space. For what the maps lacked in topographic detail they made up for in narrative power. As Buissieret has said, the maps of Juan Lopez de Velasco—in particular his “Descripción de las Yndias Occidentales”—projected an “extraordinarily coherent vision of the Spanish colonial enterprise.” This corroborates the notion that colonial maps did more to solidify ideas about the reach and success of said colonial enterprise than to accurately describe the intricacies of a large, composite geography. In fact, Buissieret writes explicitly that Juan Velasco had difficulty incorporating local as well as indigenous visions of space into his “universal” maps. He maintains that the pinturas submitted by indigenous mapmakers were of no use to the large-scale Spanish mapping project as they “were difficult for [Velasco] to interpret and incorporate.” The incomprehensibility of non-Western conceptions of territory, space, and place can be explained in large part by the existence of a metageographical narrative that pushed a singular truth about state sovereignty and legibility. Epistemological diversity was virtually incompatible with the cartographic imaginary of the Spanish. A more inclusive map was therefore impossible even before the drafting process began; the impetus behind the map and the related world view of the cartographer all but guaranteed a map that ignored indigenous presence and celebrated settler colonialism.

The perceived “wholeness” of Spanish America
was also maintained through the specific cartographic choices of the mapmaker, such as through the placement of arbitrary demarcation lines. According to Emily Parton, “The manipulation of the demarcation lines, which so boldly dissect both maps, ensures that the Indies are framed as a whole, a Castilian space.”¹⁰ This was not the only way that the cartographer’s artistic license was used in the service of narrative. Toponymic obsession accentuated the supposed triumph of exploration, conquest, and settlement. Parton explains this by saying, “...labels mark[ed] important urban centers and island groups across the Monarchy, making Spain’s domains seem ‘known.’”¹¹ Ricardo Padrón believes that the lie of undisputed colonial control and power starts with the geometric rationalization at the core of 16th century Spanish cartography. Such convenient falsehoods about the situation in the New World were held to be true because of “the cartographic tools inherent in the neo-Ptolemaic cartography of the Renaissance for reimagining the world in the service of power.”¹² He continues saying that the colonial map reproduces the “gaze of their implied observer, that universal knowing subject who could map the world according to his own purpose.”¹³

A close reading of Juan López de Velasco’s c.1575 map offers further insight into how Spanish maps both constructed and reinforced the colonial world. Planimetric cartography, in this context referring to the drawing of “flat” or “map-like” space in two-dimensions, is a form of abstraction that is especially amenable to arbitrary demarcation and territorialization. Bolded, labeled, geometric lines on Spanish maps generated false notions of uncontested, pre-ordained power and sovereignty. This can be seen on Velasco’s map with the clearly-visible Line of Demarcation, which serves to articulate Spanish and Portuguese claims previously established by the Treaty of Tordesillas (Figure 1, annotation in red). Not only were these supposedly incontrovertible dividing lines arbitrary, the mercantile and churchly interests that sought to cordon off a section of the New World were not fashioning empty, inert “space” into place. Iberia’s dubious construction of territory directly contested pre-existing claims made by sovereign indigenous polities. If drafting the first map of a newly-located land is analogous to an act of “discovery” in the traditional, blood and soil sense, the connotation of invention in the former is far more pernicious—the obfuscation of the originario is palliated by its occurrence in a microcosm of paper¹⁴ Proto-Cartesian thinking about space also privileges

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¹⁰ Emily Parton, “Historical Geopolitics and the Cartography of the Monarquía Hispánica” (History, University of York, 2014): 106.
¹¹ Emily Parton, “Historical Geopolitics and the Cartography of the Monarquía Hispánica” (History, University of York, 2014): 104.
¹⁴ For a discussion of the fallacy of “discovery” as well as the debate over the “invention” of America, see: Edmundo O’Gorman, The Invention of America; an Inquiry into the Historical Nature of the New World and the Meaning of Its History. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961); J. B. Harley, Maps and the Columbian Encounter: An Interpretive Guide to the Travelling Exhibition (Milwaukee; Golda Meir Library, University of Wisconsin, 1990); Peter Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (London ; Methuen, 1986).
universal, western-scientific, and empirical knowledge systems. The veneer of empirical objectivity gives those who see through the European cartographic lens a kind of power, one established through a hierarchy of cartographic technologies that puts western conceptions of space above indigenous (read: non-western) conceptions of space. Inclusion of numerical degrees and mathematical tick marks on the frame of Velasco’s map emphasizes that the cartography is a product of advanced technology and precise measurement (Figure 1, annotation in blue).

Equally powerful is the cartographic omission of indigenous geographies, both ones that were pre-existing and concurrent with Spanish presence. Corroborating this, Velasco’s map only includes major Spanish cities, even as the Viceroy of Perú at the time—Fran- cisco de Toledo—attempts to implement a massive general resettlement of the surviving indigenous population that would see the formation of a separate but subordinate “republika de indios” through the building of Iberian-style towns called reducciones (Figure 1, annotation in green). Administrative mismanagement often gifted these indigenous geographies degrees of freedom and agency not depicted on the map. In this way omission also contributes to the myth of pacification as well as decimation. This false notion of complete colonial (Spanish) sovereignty is engrained in the imaginary by obscuring the many ongoing processes of contestation.

While Buisseret, Parton, and Padrón write about colonial maps as a perpetuator of European fantasy, others have turned their gaze to the creation of maps by indigenous and mestizo persons in the same period. Much as how Spanish maps were informed by a preexisting cartographic imaginary, the work of colonial Quechua (Runasimi) scholar Wamán Poma is also highly reflective of his ancestry. Rather than a tool of epistemological conquest, Wamán Poma’s map can be read as an act of counter-mapping—defined in this paper as the intentional contestation of dominant or state-produced maps.

Counter-mapping is emancipatory in its promise to undermine the cartographic status quo in order to restore power to those that have been harmed by prevailing maps used as tools of coloniza- tion. Wamán Poma contests the colonial project and its assimilating goals of reducción by drawing on the Inka cartographic imaginary to promote traditional ways of conceptualizing space as well as to reassert indigenous presence.

The “Mapa Mundí del Reino de las In[di]as”

17 For example, the Mapuche raids in southern Chile, Willkapampa and the Neo-Inka state, and resistance in the Chocó region of what is now modern Columbia.
contains many of the tropes common to Inka understandings of space, geography, and territory. It boasts diagonal lines, quadripartite division, and upper-lower complementarity (moiety duality, hanan and hurin). These features were included not only as an alternative to the colonial cartographic imaginary but as a representation of the world as it was understood and experienced by those outside of the structures of power—the subaltern indios. In this way Wamán’s cartography directly counters the totalizing perspective of the Spanish universal map and brings epistemological diversity back into focus. Beyond enshrining indigenous cosmovisión, Ralph Bauer explains that Wamán Poma, “turns upside down this Eurocentric imago mundi by representing the Southern Hemisphere at the top and the Northern Hemisphere at the bottom.”

By literally inverting the near-sacred northern, Hispanicentric orientation, the mapmaker signals the primacy of Tawantinsuyu over Iberia. Gregory Cushman rightly notes that the dominant religio-spiritual and pontifical world is also overturned as Wamán, “portrays Cuzco and the four suyus of Peru ‘at a higher degree than all of Castile, Rome, and Turkey,’ in a position of prominence closest to the sun and its generative power.”

Inti above God, Willaq Umu above the Pope.

Careful analysis of artistic details in Wamán Poma’s “Mapa Mundo del Reino de las In[di]as” further substantiates the existence of a counter-mapping project and intentioned cartographic resistance. Wamán Poma’s map reaffirms the supremacy of the local. Here we see religious spatialities and the sacred imaginary of a living landscape, a pointed alternative to the unenchanted, Euclidean nature of the colonizer’s maps. The Inka cartographic imaginary is shown to be an anti-planimetric, multi-dimensional world of venerated mountains, rivers, and outcroppings—geographies dotted with wak’as. The map, borne of this understanding, gives the mountains, possibly the Andes, a prominent place at the top of the map in the upper (hanan) world (Figure 2, annotation in red).

Inka cosmovisión is infused into the map, asserting the continuing relevance of non-Western epistemologies. The map depicts kay pacha, or the middle, human-inhabited world as being surrounded by water, possibly alluding to creation myths centering on water and bodies of water (such as the myth surrounding Titiqaqa Qucha). Water is often associated with the celestial or the primordial (Figure 2, annotation in blue). A good example is the Milky Way (Mayu), itself envisioned as a cosmic river. In Wamán’s world map the land is simultaneously touched by light and dark, sun and moon, day and night (Figure 2, annotation in

green). While an impossibility, or perhaps better said, an absurdity in the minds of the Spanish, this complementary duality—known as yanantin—is an important Andean belief associated with their cosmovisión. This is yet another piece of “latent” messaging that is meant to concomitantly anchor the indigenous viewer in a familiar world of meaning and challenge the dominant cartographic imaginary.

There is great work—very limited, but great nonetheless—done on Spanish colonial and post-contact indigenous mapping. This paper is indebted to those scholars. What is, however, exciting and quite novel is this paper’s proposal that though very different in aim as well as in production, indigenous and imperial mapping projects were two sides of the same coin. Neither was as much about science or exact description of the physical landscape as they were about the epistemologies and ontologies that they reproduced, the ones ascendant and the ones under siege. The colonial process was a great information war where knowledge systems represented both the soldiers and the casualties. Not only changes in technology, dwelling, or language were at stake but a more consequential change in how the world is experienced and understood. Mapping, as an extension of the cartographic imaginary, represented an important battleground over which indigenous world views were both silenced and reasserted. This paper stresses that these battles were won as much as they were lost. Many times, indigenous persons successfully countered European (mis)understandings of space and place as well as fiercely contested the most damaging claims of the colonizer—that they had the right to others’ land, were arbiters of others’ history, and judge of others’ humanity. Today many sovereign indigenous groups, aided by allies abroad, are using participatory mapping methods to counter the land grabs made by neocolonial big business in the Amazon and elsewhere.  

These methods of cartographic resistance are not new, and the author would like to propose that a line—a complicated and long line—be drawn from pre-Hispanic times to the present. Mapping strategies were center stage in the outcome of conquest and continue to play an outsized role in questions of indigenous sovereignty, land use rights, and survival in the present.

Figure 1: Descripción de las Yndias Occidentales

Figure 2: Mapa Mvundi del Reino de las In[di]as
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To What Extent Did The Anti-Colonial Struggle Impact Pashtuns Leading Up to South Asia’s Partition?

By Layla Kharroubi, University of Leeds, Class of 2022

Background

Pashtuns are an ethnic and tribal group that exists across South Asia, predominantly in Pakistan and Afghanistan today.\(^1\) Pashtuns have a segmentary lineage system and follow Pashtunwali, their code of ethics. They were originally an egalitarian group who practiced “wesh”, understood as the redistribution of land.\(^2\) However, the establishment of revenue collection in the eighteenth century under Kabul and Mughal rule began to erode this behaviour. Under British rule in the North-West Frontier Province, wesh was further jeopardised: the colonial power extended the revenue network and allotted legal ownership of large swathes of land to their favoured khans, leading to unequal class creation.\(^3\) The colonial state particularly interfered in tribal affairs within the Settled District, by co-opting jirgas (councils) and traditional lines of authority, to extend their influence. The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act was passed in 1904, and expanded colonial control through repressive punishments, such as criminalising nationalist opposition and the use of collective punishment.\(^4\) During the nineteenth century, the NWFP suffered from little social welfare, high levels of oppression and a government who “deliberately retarded its democratic development”.\(^5\)

Anticolonial Developments Across the NWFP

From 1929 to 1947, Pashtuns were significantly affected by the anticolonial struggle. However, these impacts on Pashtuns across the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) were not homogenous. Political isolation between the Settled Districts and the Tribal Areas was a crucial factor in determining how anticolonial struggles took shape and therefore the different impacts that they created. From this, different freedom movements developed within the NWFP—violent resistance in the Tribal Areas and non-violent resistance in the Settled Districts.\(^6\)

Each anticolonial struggle impacted Pashtuns in various ways. In the Tribal Areas, armed uprisings were

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5 Banerjee, *The Pathan unarmed*, 45.
carried out against the colonial power, most notably the 1936-7 revolts led by the Faqir of Ipi. Harsh repression by the colonial state in response to violent anticolonial resistance impacted Pashtuns in the Tribal Areas, especially during World War II. Colonial socioeconomic interventions also heavily increased British presence in the Tribal Areas. In contrast, nonviolent resistance was undertaken in the Settled Districts. This involved the reform of Pashtun society and behaviour, spearheaded by Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He established the anticolonial and reformist Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (KKM) in 1929, which advocated for social justice in the NWFP and independence from the British. Ghaffar Khan’s anticolonial struggle impacted Pashtuns in the Settled Districts by elevating their political consciousness and uniting them under the doctrine of nonviolence.

The Tribal Areas and Settled Districts each also came into contact with the wider anticolonial struggle, further impacting Pashtuns. The Indian National Congress influenced Pashtuns in the Settled Districts through provincial politics, from 1937-9 during the first Frontier Congress. KKM collaboration with the Congress brought Pashtuns into the centre of nationalist politics for the first time and resulted in economic reforms targeted towards improving conditions for the peasantry. In contrast, the Muslim League impacted Pashtuns by inflaming communal tensions, firstly in the Tribal Areas and then later in the Settled Districts from 1946. Ultimately, the wider anticolonial struggle largely impacted all Pashtuns as the agreement to partition and the result of the subsequent referendum culminated in the NWFP being incorporated into Pakistan upon independence. For Pashtuns who were part of the Khudai Khidmatgar anticolonial struggle, this was a deep betrayal of their values and their many sacrifices over the years.

The NWFP was of vital geostrategic importance to the British. It was seen as the gateway to India, and a buffer zone against Russian expansion. The NWFP is split between the Settled Districts and the Tribal Ar-

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To What Extent Did the Anti-Colonial Struggle Impact Pashtuns Leading Up to South Asia’s Partition?

In the Settled Districts, the tribal system and structures were abolished; traditional jirgas were dismantled and restructured by the colonial power, and the region was incorporated into the colonial administration.\(^{18}\) In contrast, official treaties were established between the tribes in the Tribal Areas and British India.\(^{19}\) These treaties agreed that the region would remain semi-autonomous and that the Tribal Areas (40% of the NWFP population) would not be subject to any land revenue or taxes.\(^{20}\) Unlike in the Settled Districts, the Tribal Areas kept their traditional customary law, although a colonial agent was appointed to oversee the tribes. British India also regularly paid subsidies to the tribes to prevent raiding and jihads, although this was certainly not always successful.\(^{21}\)

Consequently, very different political climates were established in each region, and the colonial power endeavoured to keep them politically isolated from each other.\(^{22}\) This included strict censorship and limited communication. For example, Ghafrar Khan was repeatedly barred from entering the Tribal Areas by the colonial power to prevent a pan-Pashtun movement from developing.\(^{23}\) As a result, two radically different freedom movements developed, operating in significantly different contexts to each other; a violent anticolonial struggle in the Tribal Areas and a nonviolent anticolonial struggle in the Settled Districts. This resulted in various different impacts on Pashtuns across the NWFP.

**The Tribal Areas**

The anticolonial struggle in the Tribal Areas took the form of violent resistance. Armed raids and jihads were launched against Colonial India; the most noteworthy anticolonial resistance was the 1936-7 uprisings led by the Faqir of Ipi. Hauner points to these revolts as the watershed moment in the Faqir of Ipi’s career.\(^{24}\) This anticolonial resistance was sparked by the Islam Bibi case: a tribesman had abducted and converted a Hindu minor to Islam and then married her. British India ordered her return and this caused an uproar amongst the tribes, especially in Waziristan.\(^{25}\) The Faqir became the champion of Islam and rallied tribes under the slogan of “Islam in Danger”.\(^{26}\) This was successful in garnering support: Waziristani mullahs called for British withdrawal and many people brought food and money to the Faqir’s supporters to sustain their fight.\(^{27}\) However, only a small minority of Pashtuns were ac-

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tively involved in the fighting. Fragmentation and feuds between tribesmen hindered a united anticolonial struggle from developing and ultimately resulted in an unsustainable anticolonial struggle.

Yet the 1936-7 revolts were successful in creating huge costs for the Indian army and also drained their personnel from serving in other areas. 61,000 Indian and British troops/personnel had been deployed to Waziristan to quell the uprisings. By October 1936, the revolts had cost the British £1,200,000 in terms of operations. Therefore, violent anticolonial resistance in the Tribal Areas was successful in the short-term for threatening British rule in the Tribal Areas. However, due to the geostrategic significance of its location, the British could not risk losing the Frontier. The British response to this violent resistance impacted Pashtuns across the Tribal Areas, even those not directly involved in the anticolonial struggle.

British India responded to the anticolonial struggle in the Tribal Areas in two significant ways: by accelerating socioeconomic interventions and by increasing military interventions. Economic interventions and social initiatives into the Tribal Lands largely impacted Pashtuns. In response to the 1936-7 revolts, British India expedited its strategy of pacifying the Tribal Areas. This included development projects in which infrastructure was increasingly prioritised. Road-building had a two-fold impact on Pashtuns: it enabled quicker colonial troop deployment to better stifle anticolonial tribal unrest, and it also provided jobs to the tribesmen. The colonial state had identified economic grievances as the culprit for tribal resistance and hoped that increased economic opportunities would quell anticolonial unrest and prevent raiding.

The Colonial Administration also built schools in the Tribal Areas. For example, the two schools at Landi Kotal and Paindi Lalma between 1937-8. These infrastructure projects subsequently extended British influence in the region, encroaching on land which had previously not been touched by the British Empire. Therefore, the British response to the anticolonial resistance in the Tribal Areas increasingly brought Pashtuns under the sphere of British influence; the development projects were intended to keep Pashtuns under control and aid the colonial regime in thwarting further anticolonial resistance.

Despite the importance of socioeconomic interventions, security concerns were largely prioritised in the Frontier, especially during World War II. Military operations took the shape of troop deployment and pu-

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31 Leake, *The Defiant Border*, 27.
34 Leake, *The Defiant Border*, 41.
nitive aerial bombing campaigns. The colonial state used collective punishment, which was enshrined under the 1904 Frontier Crimes Regulation Act. This allowed whole villages to be punished for the actions of individuals. Consequently, colonial repression actually led to a short-term boost of popular support for the anticolonial struggle, leading to a further 5000-7000 Wazir Pashtuns joining the revolt. However, by late 1937, active support had largely dwindled due to tribal disunity and harsh repression. Uprisings continued in the Tribal Areas, but not on such a scale as the 1936-7 revolts.

Punitive aerial bombing remained in the colonial tool belt as a quick and efficient method to suppress anticolonial resistance. For example, after an insurgency in Datta Khel in March 1938 the British used air attacks to stifle opposition. Therefore, a direct impact on Pashtuns in the Tribal Area was Colonial India’s brutal response to the anticolonial struggle; lives, homes and villages were destroyed. The threat of brutal colonial repression, specifically the use of punitive bombing, remained prevalent during World War II, particularly due to heightened security concerns in the Tribal Areas.

Despite colonial efforts, the Faqir of Ipi remained elusive and ignited British anxieties over an anticolonial tribal alliance with the Axis powers during World War II. Security of the NWFP during the Second World War remained imperative to British policy, as India was vulnerable to attack through the Frontier. In March 1941, an allowance of £25,000 per month was obtained by the Faqir of Ipi from Axis agents, for the procurement of arms and to spread unrest in the Tribal Areas. However, the Faqir was unsuccessful in creating another large uprising. Popular tribal support for the Faqir’s anticolonial resistance largely waned during World War II. The British paid large tribal subsidies to reduce the possibility of unrest and gain their support. For example, in 1940 the British paid nearly one million rupees in tribal allowances for the whole region. This demonstrates how crucial preventing anticolonial resistance was within British policy during World War II.

The colonial threat of aerial bombardment remained integral to their security policy. For example, in 1944, two Mahsud villages were destroyed, clearly exhibiting Britain’s commitment to their campaign of harsh repression. As a result, the final years of World War II were mostly calm in the Tribal Areas.

37 Leake, The Defiant Border, 38.
38 Leake, The Defiant Border, 34.
39 Leake, The Defiant Border, 55.
41 Leake, The Defiant Border, 60.
anticolonial resistance in the Tribal Areas was thus mostly a series of short-term revolts, hindered by factionalism and disunity. The combination of harsh repression, socioeconomic initiatives and the payment of subsidies largely quieted the tribes and extended British influence further into the Frontier.

The Settled Districts

The anticolonial struggle developed very differently in the Settled Districts. This region was governed differently to provinces elsewhere. The Morley-Minto Reforms (1909) and the Chelmsford Reforms (1919) were not implemented in the NWFP; there was no representative government or legislative assembly. The province operated at a high deficit, resulting in high taxes and little social welfare provision. For example, in 1931 the literacy rate was only 5.6%. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, an anticolonial reformer, identified that living conditions in the NWFP would not improve until after the British were ousted. However, he recognised that in order to build a sustainable anticolonial struggle, Pashtun society and behaviour would have to be reformed, as blood feuds and revenge cycles were prevalent. This was attempted in two ways: elevating the political consciousness of Pashtuns and the use of nonviolence. This would result in uniting Pashtuns towards a common goal, which was vital for a successful and long term anticolonial struggle.

Social reforms were part of Ghaffar Khan’s strategy for raising awareness of anticolonial resistance. He launched the Society for the Reform of Afghans in 1921 and continued with his wider social and education work. Importantly, reforms allowed Pashtuns to gain empowerment over their own lives and enabled Pashtuns to become aware of the neglect and lack of social provisions within the NWFP. In November 1929, Ghaffar Khan launched the KKM, the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, which promoted social activism and political protest as part of the anticolonial struggle. Training camps were created to prepare and educate members about the social and political goals of this anticolonial movement.

44 Jansson, India, Pakistan Or Pakhtunistan?, 30.
45 Jansson, India, Pakistan Or Pakhtunistan?, 31.
49 Ahmad, “Frontier Gandhi,” 29; Bala, “Khuda-I Khidmatgar,” 1; Jansson, India, Pakistan Or Pakhtunistan?, 48; Shah, “Abdul Ghaffar Khan,” 91.
52 Bala, “Khuda-I Khidmatgar,” 3.
toured the Settled Districts, giving speeches on the importance of reform and resistance. This was the first time that many Pashtuns, especially those in rural areas, had heard they were under British rule. Ghaffar Khan explicitly focused his discussion on the colonial power—instead of the big khans that Britain supported—in order to prevent the KKM from becoming embroiled in a class conflict. Big khans were the large landholding elites in Pashtun society, who the British co-opted into patronage networks and used to enforce colonial rule.

This political enlightenment was crucial for his anticolonial strategy; Pashtuns needed to be aware of their circumstances, in order to understand and accept the sacrifices required of them. This would create a durable and sustainable anticolonial struggle. Therefore, the politicisation of Pashtuns was a direct impact of the anticolonial struggle in the Settled Districts. Politicisation also helped Pashtuns, especially peasants, as the KKM encouraged social activism to benefit the community. Improved living conditions were promoted and the need for better social welfare and economic policies were highlighted, as the anticolonial struggle opened many eyes to how Pashtuns were being exploited and neglected. For instance, Ghaffar Khan illustrated how Pashtun taxes were appropriated and used to fund the police and army who further acted to oppress them. The wider political context of colonial rule and how it impacted Pashtuns everyday was brought to light, resulting in the elevation of Pashtun political consciousness in the Settled Districts.

Ghaffar Khan believed that to successfully capitalise on the politicisation of Pashtun society, unity and the adoption of nonviolence needed to be achieved. Violent resistance could not create a sustainable anticolonial struggle. Violence prevented unity between Pashtuns; factionalism and feuding resulted in the fragmentation of Pashtuns who were more easily suppressed by the better equipped colonial state, as was the case in the Tribal Areas. A deeper reform of Pashtun society and behaviour was needed to successfully sustain the anticolonial struggle. This required the adoption of nonviolence, which was a key value that underpinned the KKM. For example, to become a Khudai Khidmatgar member, an oath renouncing all violence and feuds must be taken. The KKM training camps also educated and instructed members on disciplined nonviolent

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56 Banerjee, The Pathan unarmed, 56.
57 Harris, “The Mischaracterization,” 70-71.
60 Harris, “The Mischaracterization,” 69; Banerjee, The Pathan unarmed, 45.
61 Bala, “Khuda-I Khidmatgar,” 5.
tactics of protest. The KKM have thus been dubbed a “peace army.” To achieve this reform of Pashtun society and behaviour, Ghaffar Khan drew on Pashtunwali and Islamic teachings.

Pashtunwali is the ethical and moral guide that Pashtuns follow. Feuding was based on the principle of badal, understood to be revenge. Harris argues that Ghaffar Khan reconstituted the meaning of badal as reciprocity, which could be good or bad. This is persuasive as the ending of revengeful feuds was core to Ghaffar Khan’s goals. He advocated for the boycott of the colonial jirgas and instead supported feud resolution within Pashtun homes. This prevented the jirgas from exacerbating Pashtun factionalism and taught key skills necessary for the adoption of nonviolence, such as self-restraint and forgiveness.

Ghaffar Khan also drew on neglected elements of Pashtunwali, such as nanawatai (sanctuary), melmastia (hospitality) and nang (integrity). These behaviours were emphasised amongst Pashtun society, to combat feuding and violence. According to Pashtunwali, hospitality and sanctuary must even be given to enemies. Ghaffar Khan elevated these elements of Pashtunwali to pragmatically appeal to the Pashtuns’ sense of honour. Nonviolence was presented as a temporary measure, lasting until the British were successfully ousted. The elevation of Pashtun political consciousness allowed Ghaffar Khan to identify Britain as the true enemy of the Pashtuns and showcase how feuding had allowed the true enemy to survive. Pashtun honour allowed for warring factions to unite against a common foe. Using significant aspects of Pashtunwali allowed Ghaffar Khan to resituate Pashtun society and behaviour through unity and nonviolence, which directly opposed the colonial stereotype of the “martial” Pashtuns.

Ghaffar Khan also grounded the adoption of unity and nonviolence through Islamic teachings, which increased popular support. Jihad was understood as waging a war against oppression and exploitation, which the KKM embodied. However, Ghaffar Khan also emphasised the greater jihad: the personal struggle to obey God, and overcome personal weakness by demonstrating forgiveness, mercy, and justice. Ghaffar Khan elevated these virtues in Pashtun culture; the need for forbearance and patience was
heavily stressed. This is evident within the different tasks set at the KKM camps—for example, digging and sweeping were supposed to promote these qualities. Forgiveness was also presented as more honourable than revenge and Ghaffar Khan drew upon the experiences of the Prophet to demonstrate how nonviolence and collaboration with others were fundamentally complementary to Islam. As an example, the Prophet’s cooperation with other religious groups and the teaching that everyone was a creature of God was used to actively discount communal violence and stress the need for collaboration within Pashtun society and with other religious communities as well.

Therefore, a significant impact on Pashtuns living in the Settled District was a “moral transformation”. Ghaffar Khan successfully used elements of Pashtunwali and Islam to create Pashtun unity and the adoption of nonviolence. This is highlighted by the growth in KKM membership, which was dominated by Pashtuns; in 1930, KKM membership totalled less than 2000, but in 1931 this rose to 25,000 members. Eventually, KKM membership numbered 100,000 in 1938, signifying that Ghaffar Khan’s reform of Pashtun society and behaviour was wide-ranging and therefore impacted Pashtuns widely in the Settled Districts.

The National Anticolonial Struggle

The wider anticolonial struggle for national independence also impacted Pashtuns, both in the Settled Districts and in the Tribal Areas in very different ways. In the Settled Districts, impacts on Pashtuns were created by provincial politics. The 1935 Government of India Act allowed for a representative government and legislative assembly to be elected. During the subsequent 1937 NWFP elections, the Congress had the support of the KKM. A formal alliance between the two groups was reached in 1931, as they had similar goals of creating a united independent India, using nonviolent tactics. Ghaffar Khan and Gandhi were especially close, and Ghaffar Khan was also dubbed the ‘Frontier Gandhi’, demonstrating their alignment. The KKM were highly useful in mobilising and canvassing during the election campaigns. In turn, this increased support for the Frontier Congress, who went on to win the provincial election, whilst the Muslim League suffered a humiliating failure in a Muslim-majority province.

Victory by the Congress was possible due to the prospect of Hindu domination in the NWFP seeming

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73 Shah, “Abdul Ghaffar Khan,” 96.
75 Rowell, “Abdul Ghaffar Khan”, 596.
76 Ahmad, “Frontier Gandhi,” 30.
77 Banerjee, The Pathan unarmed, 59.
80 Bala, “Khuda-I Khidmatgar,” 6; Jansson, India, Pakistan Or Pakhtunistan?, 52.
unlikely—the total Muslim population of the NWFP numbered 93% in 1921. Alongside their manifesto of an independent unpartitioned India, the Congress Ministry also ran on an economic platform that appealed widely to peasants and reflected the Congress’ 1936 Lucknow commitment to reducing poverty. Specific Frontier grievances were promised to be addressed, for example, reform of the land tenure, tax and rent system. This was put into practice as taxes were reduced by a third and a set of bills were also passed in 1938, such as the NWFP Agricultural Debtor’s Relief and Produce Market Bills. Therefore, the wider colonial struggle created positive impacts for the Pashtun peasantry due to the “egalitarian thrust” of the Frontier Congress. Contrastingly, these economic reforms threatened the position of the big khans and the landlords, isolating them from the Congress. Consequently, these big khans and landlords increasingly supported the Muslim League in the Frontier to safeguard their economic interests and rival Congress power.

The 1938 Ghalla Dher agrarian unrest sparked problems for the Congress, now responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The Ghalla Dher villagers protested the imposition of high rents and illegal fines. The impacts of the KKM can be successfully seen here: the Ghalla Dher villagers were politically aware and used the tactics of nonviolent protest that they had learned from the KKM, such as peaceful sit-ins and refusals to pay fines. When the villagers were forcefully evicted, Khudai Khidmatgar members tended to their lands, highlighting Pashtun unity in force. The efforts in Ghalla Dher reinforce the success of Ghaffar Khan’s reform of Pashtun society and behaviour.

The Frontier Congress arrested the leaders of the resistance, but this sparked more protests from their female kin. For example, female family members non-violently protested in roads, but many were injured when the police charged with lathis. Eventually, all leaders were released, and the Congress abolished illegal taxes and stopped the forced evictions, promising to improve conditions for the peasantry. Acts were passed but Banerjee criticises them as “watered down”; the Frontier Congress did not want to alienate their small khan supporters who had influential force within the party.
The nationalist anticolonial struggle had a direct impact on Pashtuns due to the Frontier Congress winning the provincial elections. Some economic improvements for Pashtun peasants were made; however, their policies were tempered in an effort to cultivate increased support from the small khans who retained their privileges. The Congress’ economic policies instead resulted in the big khans feeling under attack, which pushed them towards the Muslim League. The duration of the Frontier Congress was also short, as the Ministry resigned in 1939 at the outbreak of World War II.94

The wider anticolonial struggle also came into contact with the Tribal Areas. The British had been promoting the Muslim League since the 1930s. For example, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the League and eventually of Pakistan, was allowed to visit the Tribal Areas in 1936, whilst Ghaffar Khan was repeatedly barred.95 This was a countermeasure against Congress dominance and a tool in the British’s arsenal of “divide and rule”.96 Communalism was subsequently fanned in the Tribal Areas. League supporters fostered criticism of the KKM and Congress amongst the tribes; Congress refusal to join the war effort was denounced for going against the principles of jihad and cooperation with the Nazis who were portrayed as the enemies of Islam.97 Furthermore, the KKM were also repeatedly dubbed as Bolsheviks by the British to stimulate resentment against their policies.98

In 1946, the Muslim League also encouraged demonstrations against Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of the Congress and eventual first Prime Minister of independent India, when he toured the Tribal Areas.99 When communal violence broke out across India in August 1946, League supporters reported the attacks on Muslims.100 This event led to a heightened communal atmosphere in the Tribal Areas. The dominance of the “‘Hindu’ Congress” was now taken as a threat by the tribes, when before Hindu domination was seen as impossible. Therefore, the continued criticism of the Congress and their affiliated KKM by the Muslim League led to inflaming communal violence in the Tribal areas. Tribes once again rallied around the call of “Islam in Danger” and tribal raids on non-Muslims in the Settled Districts increased as a result.101

In the Settled Districts, Hindu-Muslim relations remained mostly calm during the second NWFP elections.102 The Muslim League once again ran on a campaign of communalism, using propaganda to portray

94 Ahmad, Memon and Rabbi, “Electoral Politics,” 5-10; Jansson, India, Pakistan Or Pakhtunistan?, 11.
95 Banerjee, The Pathan unarmed, 175.
96 Harris, “The Mischaracterization,” 73.
97 Banerjee, The Pathan unarmed, 177.
102 Banerjee, The Pathan unarmed, 184.
the KKM as puppets of the Hindus and criticising their use of non-violence.\textsuperscript{103} This was largely unsuccessful as the Muslim League were once again defeated by the Frontier Congress, who won 30 out of 50 seats.\textsuperscript{104} The election of the Frontier Congress demonstrated that communalism had little effect in the NWFP.

However, the Muslim League exploited the August 1946 communal riots across India and heightened religious tensions in the NWFP.\textsuperscript{105} This was exacerbated by tribal raids and Muslim League protests and attacks on non-Muslims in the Settled Districts.\textsuperscript{106} In response, the KKM endeavoured to protect the NWFP’s non-Muslim population and tried to restore order. For example, in the Spring of 1947, 20,000 Khudai Khidmatgars marched to Peshawar after communal violence occurred.\textsuperscript{107} KKM members were also “harassed and attacked”, illustrating that the Muslim League’s adoption of communal rhetoric resulted in intrareligious violence for Pashtuns.\textsuperscript{108} Collaboration with the wider anticolonial struggles created a political and often violent divide between Pashtuns who supported the Congress and Pashtuns who supported the Muslim League.

\textbf{Partition}

Significantly, the wider anticolonial struggle impacted all Pashtuns as the nationalist parties ultimately decided on the shape that independence would take. Once independence seemed inevitable, the British sent Viceroy Mountbatten to manage the process. After his ‘Dickie Bird’ plan had been rejected by Nehru, he presented another option on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of June. This was the plan for the partition of India, which both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League accepted.\textsuperscript{109} A referendum on the NWFP’s future was decided upon with the option to either join India or Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan’s request for a third option, an independent Pashtunistan, was denied by the Congress.\textsuperscript{110} As a result, many Pashtuns felt sidelined and forsaken by the top-down political decisions enacted by the nationalist parties who had not even met with the Frontier leaders.\textsuperscript{111} Banerjee’s work showcases the attitudes of previous members of the KKM and demonstrates how they felt betrayed by the Congress’ agreement to partition and the referendum.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{104} Banerjee, \textit{The Pathan unarmed}, 184.
\textsuperscript{105} Ahmad, Memon and Rabbi, “Electoral Politics,” 19; Gilmartin, “Ethnicity,” 914.
\textsuperscript{106} Banerjee, \textit{The Pathan unarmed}, 186; Mansergh, \textit{The Transfer of Power 1942-7, Volume 7}, 522.
\textsuperscript{107} Harris, “The Mischaracterization,” 73; Banerjee, \textit{The Pathan unarmed}, 186.
\textsuperscript{108} Banerjee, \textit{The Pathan unarmed}, 186.
\textsuperscript{109} Banerjee, \textit{The Pathan unarmed}, 187.
\textsuperscript{111} Ahmad, “Frontier Gandhi,” 26; Shah, “Abdul Ghaffar Khan,” 107.
\textsuperscript{112} Banerjee, \textit{The Pathan unarmed}, 184-90.
The KKM subsequently boycotted the referendum, advocating instead for Pashtun autonomy. The referendum results were announced on 20th July 1947: only 50.99% of registered voters had voted, with 99% of votes in favour of Pakistan. The NWFP was subsequently incorporated into the new state of Pakistan. This significantly impacted Pashtuns who were KKM members: they were branded as traitors to Pakistan for having supported Congress, harassed, reduced to poverty and even imprisoned. The KKM itself was banned in Pakistan in June 1948. Regarding partition, Ghaffar Khan stated to Gandhi, “you have thrown us to the wolves”. This exemplifies the impacts that the overarching independence movement wrought on KKM Pashtun members. Their nonviolent anticolonial struggle was successful in terms of gaining independence from Britain; however, they would become incorporated into a state which would mistreat KKM members, who would become a “forgotten casualty”.

Conclusions

This essay has identified four different anticolonial struggles which impacted Pashtuns largely and in multiple ways. Firstly, the violent anticolonial resistance in the Tribal Areas impacted Pashtuns through the colonial response to this threat. Severe oppression was used, and collective punishment meant that even Pashtuns who were innocent of involvement suffered. Aerial bombing was a tactic that the British employed in the Tribal Areas to keep them under control, alongside subsidies. Socioeconomic initiatives also impacted Pashtuns in the Tribal Areas, as they gave employment opportunities while also extending British influence further into their lands.

Secondly, the nonviolent anticolonial struggle in the Settled Districts, as shown by the KKM, reformed Pashtun society and behaviour. Pashtuns became politically aware of colonial rule and the need for independence. Pashtuns in the Settled Districts also united under nonviolence, as Ghaffar Khan advocated (using Pashtunwali and Islamic teachings) for the ending of feuding and violence.

Thirdly, the wider anticolonial struggle also impacted Pashtuns through provincial politics. The Frontier Congress impacted the everyday lives of peasants in the Settled Districts as they made some economic reforms, although these were diluted to maintain good relations with the small khans. These economic reforms resulted in the big khans feeling under attack and largely alienated them, which pushed them further towards supporting the Muslim League to secure their interests.

Fourthly, the Muslim League impacted Pashtuns

113 Ahmad, “Frontier Gandhi,” 27; Harris, “The Mischaracterization,” 74; Nehru, Selected Works, 296.
both in the Tribal Areas and, later on, in the Settled Districts. Their influence in the Tribal Areas had grown due to British promotion and this impacted Pashtuns by situating nationalist politics in communal terms. It heightened communal tensions and created resentment for the Congress and its supporters. After 1946, this resulted in raiding on non-Muslims in the Settled Districts. Similarly, in the Settled Districts the Muslim League also promoted communalism, which had gained limited support before mid-1946, but grew after the communal riots across India. Muslim League agitation and attacks on non-League supporters impacted Pashtuns through intrareligious and intracommunal violence.

Ultimately, the Congress and the League accepted partition and the referendum, which impacted every Pashtun in the NWFP as it led to being incorporated into Pakistan. This impacted KKM members differently than it did League supporters. KKM members felt betrayed and sidelined by Congress’ decisions. Pashtuns involved in the KKM were consequently branded as traitors in Pakistan and the KKM itself was banned. Therefore, the various anticolonial struggles, both violent and non-violent, impacted Pashtuns leading up to partition in a multitude of ways, creating winners and losers across the NWFP.

More recently, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) has emerged, spearheaded by Manzoor Pashteen. Since 2013, Pashteen has been establishing a non-violent civil resistance network that aims to highlight the abuses and injustices that the Pakistani state commits against the minority Pashtun population. Pashteen draws inspiration from Ghaffar Khan and the strategies he used in the KKM to help guide PTM’s resistance. The Pakistani state has used harsh repression tactics to try and shut down the movement, whilst also using a familiar counternarrative that plays on the colonial stereotypes of Pashtuns as “inherently violent.” The PTM’s work has seen many successes, including the release of missing people, reduced number of check posts and the dissolution of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which was established during colonial times. Although there is much work still to be done to secure Pashtun rights in Pakistan, the PTM seems to be continuing and extending Ghaffar Khan’s legacy.

120 Jafri, “PTM”, 1.
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Chicanas, female U.S citizens of Mexican ancestry, have long fought for recognition as citizens in a nation that has exploited them and their community for decades, if not centuries. During the Civil Rights Era, the Chicano nationalist movement emerged and with it came the emergence of organized Chicana feminist thought. One of the earliest and most influential organizations was the Comisión Femenil Mexicana Nacional in the early 1970s. Yolanda Nava, one of its founding members, described the difficulties Chicanas faced without the support of the Anglo feminist movement or the Chicano movement while also describing the multifaceted nature of Chicana feminist organizations in an interview:

I don’t think any of us realized what we were doing, it’s just that we were concerned about different things: housing, employment, reproductive rights . . . all of the issues that were part of the women’s movement . . . but they were also aggregated and much more challenging for Chicanas because of course there was no women’s movement for Chicanas at that point. And we were on the cutting edge with no support from the Chicanas that we were involved in political and activist issues with.¹

Chicana activists within the movement found themselves battling assaults on multiple fronts. On the first, they worked in collaboration with Chicano activists to confront white hegemony and to assert Chicano pride and agency in a class and race based societal system. On the second, they faced misogyny from within the Chicano movement—whether they voiced it or not.

To simultaneously resist both gendered and racial discrimination and to ultimately create a new image and role for the Chicana woman, Chicana feminists appropriated and reconceptualized key concepts and tools from the broader movement as shown through print media and the creation of their own organizations. In doing so, they often clashed with the greater nationalist movement and its members for their perceived betrayal of the movement.

Past studies have focused on the male leaders and male-centric themes of the movement while leaving only a brief chapter or paragraph, if anything at all,
to provide a brief discussion of Chicana involvement and feminism. When Chicanas are studied, they are often studied not as activists with agency and leadership capabilities, but as silent followers content with subservience. This paper will contribute to the writings of feminist scholars like Maylei Blackwell, Dionne Espinoza, and Dolores Delgado Bernal by studying the relationship between the Chicano movement and the emergence of Chicana feminist thought and practice.

It begins by studying the broader movement, its main ideas, and the impact they had on Chicanas and then by discussing the appropriation and re-conceptualization of said ideas. The paper then studies feminists such as Gloria Arenellas and Anna Nieto Gomez, the creation of feminist organizations, and the publications they produced. This paper culminates in a greater discussion of the reconstructed image of the Chicana in the 1970s and 1980s.

**Discussion of the Chicano Movement**

**Chicano Movement's Roots**

Mexican Americans have had a tradition of community organizing stemming from the 1940s to confront issues ranging from education to labor but in the early 1960s, activism and organizing became much more structured and centralized. This is often attributed to the efforts of Cesar Chavez, a labor rights activist from California who created the National Farm Workers Association in 1962. Some other famous leaders that emerged included Reies Tijerina Lopez from Texas who focused his efforts on land restoration and founded La Alianza Federal de Mercedes as well as Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzalez, a poet from Colorado who founded the Crusade for Justice in 1967 and helped pen the Plan Espiritual de Aztlan which was heralded as the manifesto of the movement.

Influenced by the emerging Black nationalist movement’s emphasis on cultural pride and nationalistic identity building, the Chicano movement collaborated with African American activists during the Civil Rights Era for their shared goals and often worked in solidarity with one another. This collaboration extended to the university level as student organizations such as UC Santa Barbara’s Black Student Union (BSU) and United Mexican American Student (UMAS) collaborated to advocate for broader access to higher education for their respective communities. In 1968, they, along with Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) created the United Front to advocate for the creation of a Black Studies and Chicano Studies Departments among other

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demands.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{Issues With The Chicano Movement’s Concepts and Rhetorical Tactics}

\textit{Machismo and La Familia de La Raza}

Characterized by nationalistic militarism, the Chicano movement operated by constructing an ideal for both domestic and national order and the different roles that men and women played in both their public and private lives. The movement and its members “vacillated between cultural and revolutionary nationalism” as they adhered to the maintenance of cultural traditions to assert Chicano power and pride.\textsuperscript{8} The value of cultural traditions and the reworking of concepts used to stereotype and deride Chicano men were key components of the movement’s mission. The idea of machismo, for example, was historically used by white supremacists to denounce Chicano and Mexican men and to explain why they were kept from economic achievement rather than allowing for a more comprehensive study into capitalism’s exploitative effects on minorities. This concept was reframed within the movement to create a different and more positive image of Chicano men.\textsuperscript{9} Under this new definition, machismo was constructed as a reaction to Spanish and American exploitation and as a way to protect one’s wife and children. This modified interpretation of machismo was used as a source of cultural pride for the movement.\textsuperscript{10} This development, however, worked to the disadvantage of Chicanas as it encouraged a patriarchal culture and societal structure in which the man was always to be obeyed and followed and the woman was always to follow and remain obedient, ultimately leading to a volatile domestic sphere as machismo presented itself in expressions of gender-based violence and manipulation.

Chicanos similarly drew on the traditional emphasis on family life to create the concept of la Familia de la Raza. According to Alma Garcia, the Chicano family historically represented “a source of cultural and political resistance to the various types of discrimination experienced in American society. At the cultural level, the Chicano movement emphasized the need to safeguard the value of family loyalty. At the political level, the Chicano movement used the family as a strategic organizational tool for protest action.”\textsuperscript{11} La Familia de la Raza therefore emerged from traditional values as well as a longstanding tradition of cultural and political resistance, showing the ways in which the nationalist movement operated in both public and private spheres.

This concept was used as a rhetorical tool utilized by the movement to create a unified front based on


camaraderie and brotherhood. This was also used as a recruitment tool, as seen in the flyers made by UC Santa Barbara’s chapter of El Congreso calling on “carnales” and “hermanos” to join the El Congreso brotherhood in 1973.\(^{12}\) This concept was foundational to the conception of Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan (M.E.Ch.A), the precursor to El Congreso. M.E.Ch.A was created during the conference that resulted in El Plan de Santa Barbara in the aftermath of the United Front’s success in lobbying for the creation of the Chicano Studies Department in 1969.\(^{13}\) “The Philosophy of M.E.Ch.A” was the founding document that laid out the ideologies and values of the organization and asserted that El Plan stipulated that “Cultural values strengthen our identity as La Familia de La Raza.”\(^{14}\) La Familia thereby operated not only as a recruitment tactic, but as a unifying rhetoric to create a collective identity based on brotherhood and hierarchical gender relations.

The La Familia concept created the ideal family structure to reflect on the greater hierarchical structure in the movement and in society. This concept drew on machismo in that it placed men as the head and ultimate power of the household and subsequently society by placing them in the role of a protector. Men were expected to protect their wives and children from the dangers of racism and exploitation while women had their own distinct role in the family. They too served as protectors in the family, but they were tasked with protecting the values of the movement and la Raza by taking on the role of Revolutionary Mothers to raise children to be healthy and productive citizens.\(^{15}\)

However, just as the reworking and reclamation of machismo had detrimental effects for Chicanas in the movement, so too did the concept of la Familia de la Raza. La Familia had the adverse effect of pigeonholing women into rigid roles both within the movement and in their daily lives. They were viewed as subservient to men and were delegated feminine coded labor that was not granted the same respect and visibility as male labor.\(^{16}\) Their worth as individuals in the movement and in society was placed in their reproductive ability. A poem published in *Regeneración*, a publication created by Francisca Flores in 1970, exemplified the dichotomy between the role of Chicanos and Chicanas as it calls on Chicanos to become educated, reclaim their land, and empower their communities while saying of women:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Linda mujer Mexicana} & \\
\text{De la piel morena obscura} & \\
\text{Eres madre y hermana} & \\
\text{Tus hijos reflejan tu hermosura} & \\
\text{Madre del Indio Frondoso} & \\
\text{Con tu amor y ternura} & 
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{12}\) El Congreso collection. UArch 104. University of California, Santa Barbara.


Hazlo sentirse orgulloso
Y que demuestre su bravura\textsuperscript{17}

Lovely Mexican woman
Of dark brown skin
You’re a mother and sister
Your children reflect your beauty

Mother of the leafy Indian
With your love and kindness
Make him proud
And let him show his courage

Interestingly, Chicanas were able to use this rhetoric to their advantage and legitimize their right to organize. This presented itself in a variety of ways: from the symbolic costumes of mourning women in the moratorium to the reclamation of La Malinche. La Malinche, or “the traitor” refers to Malinztin, the indigenous woman who served as Hernan Cortes’ translator and mistress in the early 16th century. Frequently constructed as an evil and promiscuous woman who led to the downfall of the Aztec empire, she was reconstructed as the mother of all mestizos and the creator of the Chicano people.\textsuperscript{18} By shifting the acceptable role of motherhood, Chicanas were able to achieve flexibility in an otherwise rigid societal and domestic role to gain a positive historical figure and legitimize their position as activists.

Reevaluating their role within the movement and in La Familia de la Raza required that they reassess their role in the family, where they were expected to derive their sense of self. Ironically, then, the paradoxical marginalization that women experienced within a movement that called for equality and justice encouraged female activists to reinvent themselves as feminists by reworking the concepts and roles that had been carefully structured by the broader movement.

Historical Iconography

Chicano activists drew a collective identity and ideology from an indigenous heritage and perpetuated a narrative of a mythic homeland they called Aztlan. They drew upon cultural icons to assert pride in Chicano heritage.\textsuperscript{19} This practice can best be seen in Corky Gonzales’ poem, “I Am Joaquin.” Throughout the poem, the narrator “Joaquin” details the struggles that Mexicans and Mexican Americans faced in their struggle for equal rights by identifying with his ancestors, both Spanish and Indigenous. He then identifies with revolutionary figures throughout Mexican history such as Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, Benito Juarez, Pancho Villa and Joaquin Murrieta. The only reference to

\textsuperscript{17} M. Meneses, “Rincon Poetico,” Regeneración vol. 1 no. 7 (1970), 22.

Translated literally, “Indio Frondoso” means leafy Indian but likely refers to someone with many siblings or someone part of a large group, as if one of many leaves.


\textsuperscript{19} Blackwell “Bearing Bandoleros,” 178.
women within Gonzalez’s epic poem is the nameless wife of Joaquin Murrieta who was raped and killed.\textsuperscript{20} The images and figures relied upon as unifying symbols of power were all male.\textsuperscript{21} And while women could identify with the ideologies perpetuated by the symbolic use of these historical revolutionary men, they struggled to find similar historical figures to model themselves after.

The images provided for women within the movement were either non-existent or were nameless one-dimensional characters. While men found strength and power from the icons they thought best represented Chicanismo and machismo, Maylei Blackwell argues that the icons women were expected to model themselves after were substandard and demeaning by comparison. She argues that the \textit{soldadera} and adelita characters existed only to complement the men and to act as foot soldiers content with subservience and as revolutionary sweethearts who would then go on to birth the new nation. She argues that because these images were so substandard, Chicana feminist organizations like Hijas de Cuauhtémoc, an organization founded by Anna Nieto Gomez in 1971, had to refigure these images to make them more empowering and legitimate.\textsuperscript{22} Without this reconfiguration, the image of the adelita and the \textit{soldadera} remains a simplistic construction and reinforces sexist beliefs pertaining to women’s leadership capabilities due to what Norma Cantu, an academic from the 1980s, identifies as the Adelita complex. She argues that the images of adelitas and \textit{soldaderas} within the Chicano movement are insufficient and faulty because they connote the woman as a follower or as a nurturer, “but the Adelitas and soldaderas were not merely followers— they were often military strategists, political thinkers who gave the Mexican Revolution more than tortillas and beans.”\textsuperscript{23}

These ideological concepts and rhetorical strategies helped create a unified identity for Chicanos in the Chicano movement but were unable to serve the same purpose for Chicanas unless they actively worked to make these roles meaningful. Chicanas recognized the impact that these concepts had on their daily lives as female activists within the movement as the concepts were put into practice.


\textit{Women Within the Chicano Movement’s Organizations}

Because of the lack of respect afforded to female activists, leadership in the movement’s organizations was often primarily male. The women who became leaders in student organizations were few and far between and they often experienced extreme harassment and disparagement from their peers. Occasionally the election of female leaders and delegates caused derision and embarrassment. San Diego State

\textsuperscript{22} Blackwell, “Bearing Bandoleros,” 182.
University’s UMAS chapter in 1970 was primarily led by women and when they hosted a conference featuring Corky Gonzalez, the organization decided it would be “improper and embarrassing for a national leader to come on campus and see that the organization’s leadership was female.” Subsequently, they decided that the representatives of the organization would solely be male members. Chicanas in leadership positions were often victim to demeaning gossip and rumors regarding their sexuality or even faced cruel harassment. When one Chicana was president of M.E.Ch.A at California State University Long Beach, male members of the organization hung an effigy of her and planned a funeral for the doll. In some instances, the harassment was so bad that visible female leaders were forced to rely upon male friends to act as liaisons in order to legitimize their leadership. These “compañeros” were especially important when addressing black student leadership, as they too held reservations against female leaders.

Women were essentially accepted in these organizations as members so long as they remained subordinate to males and kept out of visible roles of leadership. Instead, they served as secretaries and were in charge of cooking, cleaning, and making coffee for meetings and conferences. The labor they were encouraged to do within the organizations essentially paralleled the labor they were expected to do within the household. Isabel, one of the founding members of UC-LA’s Raza Womyn group in 1979 asserted that while she did not think that men were “evil, super duper macho men,” they did want to be taken care of by women without fully addressing their needs.

Female members of the East L.A. chapter of the Brown Berets were similarly asked to do all of the cooking and cleaning when members of the chapter stayed at Corky Gonzalez’s house and others recall being asked to dance for the amusement of Reies Lopez Tijerina, the famous Chican no land rights activist.

Likewise, Castillo asserts that the men had trouble relating to women outside of their roles as girlfriends or sexual conquests. Unlike the experiences of the young women in Raza Womyn who were expected to act as secondary mothers to the male members, Castillo identifies a more sinister product of misogyny within student organizations by asserting that some men requested “sexual cooperation as proof of commitment to the struggle.” These kinds of ideas were present in more subtle and romanticized ways, such as in a poem from Regeneración which read:

26 Del Castillo and Mora, “Mexican Women,” 8.
29 Espinoza, “Revolutionary Sisters,” 32.
I am proud of you Chicana,
Fight to preserve your chastity
Let it be known you will belong,
To a soldado Chicano like me;
I love you deeply Chicana,
You are nature’s gift to me,
You are the center of attraction,
No matter where you may be.  

This poem exemplifies the romanticized ideal of the revolutionary sweetheart and the ways that the movement’s ideologies placed value on women for their bodies and their sexuality rather than for their actual capabilities for leadership. Chicanas were delegated a lower-class status in which their worth to the movement was measured by their adherence to traditionally feminine roles and their visibility in the movement’s organizations was curtailed by male members. While women were not typically allowed the more visible forms of leadership in the movement, they still were engaged in different forms of leadership.

*Reconceptualizing Leadership*

Because women were typically restricted from participating in the more visible forms of activism, historians have traditionally studied Chicana activists as followers rather than as leaders. However, Dolores Delgado Bernal argues that in order to accurately study the gendered differences in participation, the very concept of leadership must be re-examined and reconceptualized. She analyzes the experiences of Chicana leaders during the East L.A Blowouts in 1968 to conceptualize grassroots leadership and argue that leadership encompasses five different aspects: organizing, networking, spokesperson, developing consciousness, and holding office. The Chicanas within the Brown Berets similarly engaged in these practices and exhibited levels of leadership that are typically ignored.

The Blowouts occurred as a result of the inadequate education and facilities afforded to Mexican American high school students in the late 1960s. As more and more Chicanos began entering higher education, they began to critically analyze the discriminatory education system and rally for more efforts to increase student retention and graduation to promote higher education in their communities. Students were forbidden from speaking Spanish in the classroom and were subject to corporal punishment. Mexican American students were often “tracked” into special education courses and gendered trade and vocational classes rather than college prep courses. In addition to discriminatory and inefficient educational practices, the buildings themselves were substandard. According to Rosalinda Mendez Gonzalez, one of the activists interviewed by Bernal:

There were teachers who would say, ‘You dirty Mexicans, why don’t you go

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33 Bernal, “Grassroots Leadership,” 119-120.
back to where you came from?’ So there was a lot of racism we encountered in the school. We had severely overcrowded classrooms. We didn’t have sufficient books. We had buildings that were barack-type buildings that had been built as emergency, temporary buildings during World War II, and this was in the late 1960s, and we were still going to school in those buildings.34

The complaints of students were recorded in a needs assessment survey created and spread through the efforts of Chicanas such as Vickie Castro, Paula Crisostomo and Rachael Ochoa Cervera, demonstrating one of the key tenets of leadership described by Bernal: organizing. These complaints were then discussed in the meetings that Chicanas participated in and hosted in order to create a list of demands. Tanya Luna Mount was so well known for hosting such meetings that a conservative news commenter once gave her address out on live television, denouncing her home as a hotbed for “being commies, rebel rousers, and anti-government.”35

Chicanas were also involved in developing consciousness through informal dialogues with friends, family, and community members. One of the more effective and influential tools in raising awareness was print media. They created informational leaflets and flyers and were all connected to community activist newspapers such as Inside Eastside and La Raza.36 Chicanas in the East L.A. chapter of the Brown Berets were also heavily involved in producing the publication La Causa and made up most of its editorial board. While they were tasked with running the publication as a whole, they used La Causa to articulate emerging feminist thought “negotiating externally imposed gender roles and their own sense of themselves as revolutionary women” by situating themselves within a historical narrative of revolutionary men and indigenous imagery and by claiming that the female Brown Beret has moved beyond the passive Mexican wife.37

Chicanas also participated in networking to legitimize their actions to the public and to raise awareness of the issues they faced. The necessity of gaining endorsements was especially poignant given that many in the community were concerned that the Blowouts were merely an expression of youthful disobedience or worse, communism. Gaining support and endorsements made their cause much bigger and much more legitimate in the eyes of the public. Though half of the women interviewed held office, they typically viewed their most substantial work to be the more private work they did behind the scenes. Likewise, though there were instances in which they acted as spokespeople, this was

34 Bernal, “Grassroots Leadership,” 120.
36 Bernal, “Grassroots Leadership,” 128.
not one of the main avenues of activism for them.\textsuperscript{38} Gloria Arenellas expressed a similar sentiment about her own official role as the Minister of Correspondence and Finance in the Brown Berets in that she felt it was nothing but a glorified secretary and a leadership position for a token female leader in an otherwise all-male board.\textsuperscript{39}

The gendered division of labor can be seen in the Blowouts of 1968 but this worked to the advantage of Chicanas who were noticeably absent from the L.A 13, the 13 men arrested on charges of conspiracy. While they were in jail, Chicana activists such as Gloria Arenellas of the Brown Berets provided the organization with much needed leadership and stability by fundraising and answering phone calls as well as raising awareness to have them released by participating in the sit ins to have Sal Castro reinstated, writing for and publishing \textit{La Causa}, and by writing letters. This labor was kept behind the scenes and consisted of organizing and networking through the feminine labor allowed to them.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Chicanas Break Away, 1970-1981}

As Chicanas began critically analyzing their lack of support and respect, their attempts at reconfiguring their roles to allow for more active involvement and leadership within the organization conflicted with the ideals of the greater movement. Moving away from traditionally feminine labor in these organizations meant reworking the role of women in the idealized family influenced societal structure. These efforts conflicted with the ideas of the greater movement and the growing community of Chicana feminists often found themselves completely breaking from the organizations they once belonged to. However, they were simultaneously cautious of identifying with white feminists and the white feminist movement and continuously reasserted their loyalty to the Chicano movement. Despite their efforts, Chicana feminists were denounced as diverting necessary attention away from the movement and its goals.\textsuperscript{41}

They faced harsh criticism whether they remained in the organization or not. Raza Womyn originally existed as a subcommittee of M.E.Ch.A but as they attempted to create their own space for their own activism in 1981, they were met with such harsh resistance that they were forced to meet in the women’s bathrooms as many male members of M.E.Ch.A would often intrude on their meetings.\textsuperscript{42}

At the national level, Chicanas caused a stir when they broke away from the founding East L.A. chapter of the Brown Berets in 1970. Under the guidance of Gloria Arellanes, female Brown Berets created their own organization called Las Adelitas de Aztlan.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\bibitem{Bernal} Bernal, “Grassroots Leadership,” 130-131.
\bibitem{Espinoza} Espinoza, “Revolutionary Sisters,” 19.
\bibitem{Cotera} Marta Cotera, “Feminism: The Chicana and Anglo Versions, a historical analysis,” in \textit{Chicana Voices: Intersections of Class, Race, and Gender}, (Albuquerque, NM: 1993), 228.
\bibitem{Revilla} Tijerina Revilla, “Community Organizing,” 802.
\end{thebibliography}
They broke away from the main organization due to the lack of respect and visibility given to them and to their work in the free health clinic, the news publication, and the Brown Berets in general. *La Causa* was used in the final weeks before the break to discuss the historical images of female revolutionary figures through which Chicanas drew upon for their identity as revolutionaries and asserted that they were no longer the passive Mexican women.\textsuperscript{43}

Despite the fact that they broke away from the larger organization, they continued relying on the rhetoric of family; not to emphasize the patriarchal structure put forth by the concept of La Familia, but by emphasizing the sense of hermanas en lucha, of revolutionary sisterhood. A flyer inviting Chicanas to join the new organization directly appealed to this imagined familial bond and ideology by using the phrase, “porque somos una familia de hermanas.”\textsuperscript{44} Likewise, they were able to use their identities as women as a rhetorical strategy in the moratorium in which they dressed as mothers mourning their sons to protest the Vietnam War and the draft.\textsuperscript{45} In this way they were able to exercise a degree of flexibility within their role as women by calling back to an acceptable image of Chicana mothers in mourning.

The rhetoric utilized by Las Adelitas went beyond just the concept of sisterhood and family. Similar to how Chicano activists drew upon revolutionary historical figures such as Emilio Zapata, and Pancho Villa, Las Adelitas drew upon the imagery of the soldaderas, the women who fought for Mexican independence during Mexico’s Revolutionary War. While Blackwell critiqued the imagery of adelitas, the organization itself did not fall prey to the Adelita Complex identified by Cantu due to the fact that it steadfastly resisted misogyny and worked to give a deeper meaning to the label. Chicana feminists therefore adopted the movement’s methodology to create a unified identity just as they adopted and adapted the concept of la Familia to create a new image and role for themselves. In doing so, they created an acceptable space for themselves as Chicanas and as feminists within the movement.

Another group that broke away from M.E.Ch.A in 1971 was the Hijas de Cuauhtémoc. This organization began as an informal “rap group” that was intended to provide incoming Chicanas at the California State University of Long Beach with a safe and supportive space but evolved into a more focused organization following the publication of their newspaper of the same name. This name took inspiration from a feminist organization from the Mexican Revolution that advocated for suffrage and education rights for women. In 1973 they went on to create and publish *Encuentro Femenil*, the first Chicana feminist scholarly journal.\textsuperscript{46}

Blackwell argues that both publications were incredibly influential in that they represented a change

\textsuperscript{43} Espinoza, “Revolutionary Sisters,” 20.
\textsuperscript{44} Espinoza, “Revolutionary Sisters,” 18.
\textsuperscript{45} Espinoza, “Revolutionary Sisters,” 37.
\textsuperscript{46} Blackwell, *Chicana!*, 19.
in iconography to depict a more egalitarian organization and create a space in which they were able to forge "new political identities, discourses, and strategies," for Chicanas.\textsuperscript{47} The same could be said for each of the publications and organizations utilized by the emerging Chicana feminists. However, by calling back to a revolutionary indigenous figure rather than a nameless Aztec princess and a feminist organization of the past, the Hijas worked to craft an image of an organization based in real historical events rather than a romanticized mythical past. They further worked to carefully develop an image of community and education minded Chicanas through their articles.

By covering a broad array of issues ranging anywhere from politics to education to birth control, the Hijas de Cuauhtémoc situated themselves and their writing in both publications within the Chicano movement but with an emphasis on how these issues affected women. They further sought to encourage men to gain awareness of their own actions and how the ideologies and concepts perpetuated by the broader movement negatively affected the Chicanas within the movement.\textsuperscript{48}

Through their active participation in the nationalist Chicano movement, Chicanas in the 1960s and 1970s became aware of the additional inequities they faced in their day-to-day lives as women. They began reconceptualizing and appropriating the key ideological concepts and rhetorical tools so crucial to the broader movement to envision a new image for Chicana women based on historical iconography and sisterhood. They articulated this new role through their work on publications such as \textit{La Causa}, \textit{Hijas de Cuauhtémoc}, \textit{Encuentro Femenil}, and \textit{Regeneracion}. Their work on these publications and in organizations ultimately served to not only articulate and develop this new image but also to create a space within the movement for Chicanas to learn valuable leadership skills and develop a feminist consciousness amongst themselves and their community. In doing so, these emerging feminists created a community of revolutionary sisters based on a dedication to justice and equality and on trust.

\textsuperscript{47} Blackwell, \textit{Chicana!}, 19.
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The Use of Hybrid Traditions as Policy in the Consolidation of Mughal Power in Early Modern South Asia

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Introduction

The Mughal Empire was unique in both its pluralist characteristics and the syncretic nature of its rule. It transcended ethnic and religious boundaries, and the new ‘hybrid traditions’ created by the amalgamation of local and Timurid culture significantly helped to consolidate Mughal authority in early modern South Asia. More than that, these traditions forged a particular new identity that can clearly be seen as a product of Mughal imperial authority. Acknowledgement, acceptance, and assimilation with these ‘hybrid’ traditions was instrumental in consolidating Mughal imperial authority for centuries among a diverse population of different creeds and cultures.

This interpretation runs counter to colonialist and nationalistic narratives of the coherence of the Mughal state. It offers a revisionist approach that will first be set against existing historiographical frameworks; next, the analysis will explore a more complex interpretation that seeks to move well beyond colonialist historians’ approaches by combining several different strands of revisionist history. The extent to which invention of hybrid traditions was actively encouraged by the court will be investigated, and the positions of successive emperors will be contrasted. This essay will explore not only courtier traditions that trickled down into the wider consciousness, but also the extent to which local traditions found their way into Mughal courts. Once these processes are understood, it becomes necessary to conclude that a very significant degree of assimilation existed within the Empire and that this was significant to the consolidation of imperial power. Finally, the relative significance of administrative and military policies, and the importance of hybrid traditions to these policies, will also be explored. Altogether, it will be seen that the creation of hybrid traditions at all levels produced a unique Mughal identity that subconsciously manufactured consent for Mughal authority across the wider population.

Historiography of the Mughal State

The mainstream historiography of the Mughal Empire focuses on the nature of the state. It takes a linear view and tends to portray the Empire as both centralised and bureaucratic. For instance, British colonialist historians, borrowing Max Weber’s paradigm of the bureaucratic state, have viewed the military and fiscal institutions of the Empire as ‘steel frames’ enabling the

imperial family to consolidate power. Similarly, historians of the Marxist-Aligarh school have emphasised the highly centralised fiscal system, based on collecting agrarian revenue, that characterised the state. These approaches are problematic, not only in the precedence they give to the study of fiscal policy, but in the way they ignore historical accounts that show the Empire was dynamic. Historians Sanjay Subrahmanyam and Muzaffar Alam suggest taking a revisionist approach instead, and incorporating more than one perspective, noting the usefulness of the Timurid-genealogical approach and Pan-Asian Indological comparative approach. Aspect of a dynamic revisionist approach can be seen in Historian Azfar Moin’s *The Millennium Sovereign*, a work that goes beyond area studies, and argues that the frameworks adopted by earlier scholars and prevented them from exploring the reality of interconnectivity in this period. Moin’s most significant contribution, however, lies in his methodological approach. He seeks to go beyond textual sources and instead turns to visual sources to evidence the syncretic symbolism that legitimised the sovereignty of the King. This approach is not without its shortcomings – in restricting his approach to a focus on ritual, Moin explores the king’s sacred role and shows how his rule was legitimised, but large-

Hybrid tradition: a Mughal policy of universal reconciliation

The creation of hybrid traditions was a deliberate political policy by the Mughal Emperors to consolidate power. Hybrid traditions are the new traditions that emerged from the amalgamation of Persian culture with local ones specific to Mughal emperors. Mughals considered the essence of *Sul-i-Kull*, Sufi concept of universal reconciliation, as the main criterion to their superior status as Kings and hybrid traditions was one way they practices *Sul-i-kull*. The empire was not a static ‘perfected’ culture throughout the reign of the six emperors starting from Babur to Jahangir, but rather

4 Alam and Subrahmanyam, *Mughal State*, 4-5.
The emperors either continued, changed, or created new traditions and customs that suited their political aspirations over the various regions they governed. The reason for this political approach can be understood from the Mughals’ ties with the Timurid dynasty. For instance, before the Mughals, the Delhi sultanates governed around concepts of Shari’a, Kofr, Jihad and Jizya with only some emphasis on integration that sometimes caused issues in their relationship with Hindu nobles.

So when Babur came to power, his governance instead drew from the Akhlaq-e-Homayuni where the author in the preface described the book as a summarisation on other political writings, including Naser Al-Din Tusi’s Akhlaq. Succeeding Emperors made Akhlaq-e-Naseri, originally written in 1235, a mandatory reading material for the nobles, and by the time of Shah Jahan, the book became a staple in madrasa curriculum. This was imperative as the Nasirean text itself began with a discussion of the Quran and traditions of the Prophet along with an emphasis on universal values, preaching co-operation, then ended with the view that sharia’a practiced by various Prophets were changed according to their times. It is evident from the central role that the Mughal emperors assigned to Nasirean ethics that they recognised the importance of assimilation in maintaining their rule. Universal reconciliation, Sul-i-kul, with Hindu ruling elites thus became the keystone of imperial policy. The state encouraged co-operation, including the hybridisation of Timurid traditions and local culture in ways that resulted in the creation of new and universal customs. It was a necessary reaction to their position as a Muslim elite ruling over an ethnically and religiously diverse region, and it was core to their political philosophy.

Amalgamation of local and Mughal structures in the economic administration

The vast empire itself was ruled and controlled by a remarkably flexible administration. This grafted Persianized elements to pre-existing regional administrative styles, creating a hybrid system that made it easier to link local authority back to the imperial Mughal court. Whilst connection to the court existed through presence of mansabdars, the way regions were governed had no exact homogeneity. For instance, the A’in stated the way regions were administered were usually a continuation of what had existed before Mughal conquest. This is because the different regions had different customs, and the circumstances in which they were made a part of the Empire also depended on Nasirean policy of co-operation when it came to local administration of the regions. Thus, this essay rejects the tradi-

15 Alam and Subrahmanyam, Mughal State, 40.
tional historiographical positions of that by W.H More-
land who viewed the Empire to have a homogenous and
highly centralised system of revenue collection that was
reminiscent of ‘oriental despotism’ to him. This should
not be confused to mean the administrative layer was
superficial. The A’in ensured whilst existing structures
from pre-Mughal rule stayed, they were kept in place
with a degree of Mughal control. For instance, in Ben-
gal, zamindars could still rule their regions if they paid
revenue according to 16th century Akbari-Todarmali to
the Nawab.16 But at the same time the Nawabi Diwan
(authoritative man) was placed to tighten control on the
rural areas. This is because consolidation of imperial
authority could only be administered if there was an
organisation of hierarchy of power within the regions.17
So by co-operation with existing administrations, and
adding a degree of Mughal control, the hybrid political
traditions maintained the different rural and urban re-
regions. This ensured both rural and far-reaching regions
would acknowledge Mughal administrative authority
without being tyrannical. Furthermore, the adminis-
trative system was not static, homogeneous or centralised
as traditional and Marxist-Aligarh historians propose.
For instance, unlike Bengal where Nawabs had consid-
erable power over rural regions, in Punjab the Khatris,
who were Sikhs, were allied to the Mughal state. They
used their higher position in the administration to en-
force Mughal power in the region, which also led to
flourishing trade for themselves.18 That was not a char-
acteristic of a rigid bureaucracy. Rather the adminis-
trative layers acted as a point of connection between
the regions and the imperial court. This worked as a re-
minder, without the layer of tyranny, that real authority
rested with the Mughal imperial court.19

\textbf{Jharoka-i-Darshan: a case study in hybrid Mughal
courtier traditions}

Even courtier traditions reflected a new inclu-
sive identity uniquely associated with Mughal rule in
the consciousness of wider subjects. The Mughal em-
perors’ legitimacy as Padshahs relied on their ancestry
to Timur, and used a set of symbols, metaphors, and
ceremonial acts to resemble this authority.20 They were
also deeply aware of their precarious position of rul-
ing over a vast territory of multi-ethnoreligious peo-
ple, whilst they themselves were a minority of Muslim
elite.21 The Padshahs conflated the Hindu practice of
Darshan with the Islamic concept of accessibility to
rulers, and created the hybridised Mughal courtier tra-
dition of Darshan-i-Jharoka.22 Jharoka is a word de-
noting a ‘viewing window’ unique to Mughal imperial
buildings. Other than architectural sources, this prac-

19 Shivram, “Mughal Court Rituals,” 345.
20 Shivram, “Mughal Court Rituals,” 333.
21 Koch, “Imperial Self-representation,” 93.
The use of hybrid traditions as policy in the consolidation of Mughal power in early modern South Asia

tice was also recorded in both textual and visual sources such as the painting of Emperor Jahangir at Agra fort’s Jharoka (window) in 1640 by Abu’l Hasan, and similar paintings of Akbar, Shah Jahan and even Aurangzeb in 1710. The paintings were commissioned because the Mughals wanted to reach the largest possible audience and they considered art and architecture to be the best instrument through which to self-represent their rule and reach the masses. Historians such as Nuckolls view symbols and ceremonial acts as a way to consolidate authority because they were simple to understand, so they transmitted values on a conscious level easily. The performance of this tradition evoked an act of reverence for the Padshah as it was necessary to look up and behold the Padshah, in a manner similar to the way in which Hindu gods were revered. At the same time, it was evident to anyone who looked at the Jharoka that the Padshah himself maintained a level of accessibility with respect to his subjects. That evoked a sense of connection and relationship that formed a ritual legitimisation and consolidated the Padshahs rule in the consciousness of wider subjects, not just his courtiers. For instance, during Akbar’s reign, Akbar showed up at the Jharoka window twice a day and listened to the complaints of ordinary people. Thus not only was the Jharoka popular amongst the wider population, but it also showed an engagement of the people acknowledging the emperor’s position to make decisions, hence legitimising his power and claims of the title of Padshah. The importance of this could be understood from the fact that the emperor continued this tradition even when he travelled to the different Subahs. For instance, even in the battlement forts or travelling houses, there was a Jharoka window where he would stand, and there would be a crowd of well-wishers, supplicants, and wider population to just see the ruler. Thus the Jharoka-i-Darshan tradition created a new identity specific to Mughal rule, where the emperor was accessible to ordinary people. The mixture of accessibility and ‘familiarness’ in the practice, whilst being exclusively unique Mughal identity gave an aura of legitimacy. This legitimacy trickled into the consciousness and memory of the wider population, thus cementing the authority of Mughal emperors on these subjects.

Mangalkavyas: a case study in the adaptation of local culture to Mughal authority

The ways in which local and provincial cultures identified with the Padshah itself also gave meaning and legitimacy to the imperial court’s power. As Farhat Hassan has pointed out, the authority of the state was deeply entangled with the ways in how it was per-

23 San Diego Museum of Art, Emperor Aurangzeb at a Jharoka window, c.1710
24 Koch, “Imperial Self-representation,” 93.
ceived within the existing frameworks.28 A focus on the ways Mughal rule materialised under local and provincial culture is necessitated. One of the most prominent literatures that demonstrated local people’s perception on Mughal rule was in the various Mangalkavya narratives from the Bengal Subah. Mangalkavya’s are a Hindu religious texts that focuses on narratives of Hindu deities within social scenarios. For instance, in the late 16th Chandimangalkavya produced by Dwija Madhayva, the story was of a monster named Mongoldaitya that was slain by the Goddess Kali.29 This coincided with the harsh military campaigns at the time to conquer Bengal that spread a lot of violence and terror that came with war. M.R Tarafdar suggested the terms ‘Mongol’ and ‘Mangal’ was used to refer to Mughals.30 Whilst this shows there was a negative perception of Mughals at the time, it also demonstrated the presence of Mughal power was acknowledged even by those that did not support it. The remarkable influence of the Mughal on local culture is demonstrated more so when the narrative changed in the later kavyas. They portrayed Mughals in a more positive narration that included assimilation with local religious traditions. The Bengali poet Madhavacharya wrote Akbar was the incarnation of Hindu god Arjuna and mighty like the sun, while the Hindu poet Jagat Mangal said of Shah Jahan to be ‘king of all kings’ and the winner of fame over the land of Bengal.31 Whilst these might suggest there was universal acceptance of the Mughal emperors in a positive light, reality was a little more nuanced.

There was still a perception of difference between Bengali culture and Mughal culture. However, it was never one of intolerance, but rather the difference was framed to suggest there was space for dialogue. For instance, the Annadamangalkavya written in 1752 by Bharatchandra Roy, who was one of the most famous Bengali poets in the 18th century. Roy narrated in his kavya the Mughal’s military campaigns were misguided at the start, but the Mughals later realised they were wrong and chose the ‘just’ path and embraced the worship of the Bengali Goddess.32 The allegory of the story established the Goddess of Bengal as the utmost powerful in relation to the Emperor, yet simultaneously conveyed Mughal rule was characterised with assimilation. Furthermore, it implied that Mughals were therefore an acceptable ruler for Bengali culture, rather than a rigid or foreign tyranny like earlier versions.33 Firstly, this suggested that Mughal administration was not an alien rule in Bengal since they respected the goddess tradition. Secondly it implied that Mughal authority

30 Chatterjee, “Goddess encounters,” 1452.
33 Chatterjee, “Goddess encounters,” 1461.
was thus legitimate in Bengal. This coincided with a period when the Mughals made cultural investments in Bengal. Furthermore, Goddess worship was adhered to at all levels of society, not just the learned and the upper classes. Thus, the kavya, whilst written by the respected classes of poets, had significance even amongst the masses that worshipped the goddesses. So, the inclusion of Mughals in this story was not just in the upper echelons of society, but the lower classes too. Thus, the Mangalkavyas demonstrated not only the ways in which Mughal influence impacted on local culture, but also the way imperial authority was accepted, and in turn legitimised and shaped, by the local traditions. Finally, and most significantly, the ways in which the narratives themselves adapted in ways that suggest the wider population now viewed imperial authority as legitimate and Indian, not illegitimate and foreign, demonstrates the impact and success of Mughal policy. More importantly this demonstrated how local culture changed to newer pluralistic inclusive traditions, not from being enforced from the top down, but rather naturally.

**The impact of hybrid traditions on Mughal military policy**

The military aided in the consolidation of power at the inception of conquest, but hybrid traditions sustained the Mughal Empire in the long run. Unlike traditional historians of the colonialist British school, recent scholars have been fascinated with the pluralistic and cosmopolitan view of the Mughals and their universalism. However, Sulh-i-Kull alone could not achieve an acceptance of Mughal authority in the initial phases of conquest. For example, Humayun was pushed back in the 1550s and 1560s and Akbar’s armies had to re-conquer Bengal again in the 1570s and 1580s. Even as late as the 1630s under Shah Jahan, Portuguese traders were settled and successful in Chittagong concomitantly, while Bengal was also leaning more towards Arakanese influence. Since some Mangalkavyas spoke positively of Shah Jahan in this period, it seems that his attempts to amalgamate cultures and merge traditions had at best a limited impact in sustaining Mughal authority without military enforcement. However, the policy of Sul-i-Kull did begin to have a greater impact in the longer term, and – particularly when the state sought the military co-operation of local chieftains – acceptance of Mughal authority also increased. For instance, rebellions in Bengal were put down not only by the imperial army but also forces from other zamindars. In the early 17th century, Raja (of Tahirpur) used his newfound power from his alliance with the Mughals to stage the first ever grand Durga Pujas, then made it open to the ordinary masses to gain widespread status.

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34 Chatterjee, “Goddess encounters,” 1436.
35 Chatterjee, “Goddess encounters,” 1462.
38 Alam and Subrahmanyam, *Mughal State*, 42.
as protector of Brahmanical samaj. This demonstrated the new prosperity of these rajas were attributed to their alliance with the Mughal. Mughal emperors enabled them to hold widespread celebrations of the first Durga Pujas, and these included a large selection of people, including the ordinary masses. While it was military force that enabled the expansion of imperial power, control was cemented via cultural alliances, and these alliances were reflected in the make-up and rituals of the Imperial court. The presence of Sul-i-Kull and the adoption of elements of culture characteristic of the territories that the empire absorbed also created a sense of security and safety for the mass of the people. These subjects, continued to live under the familiar Rajas, and this in turn undoubtedly made it easier for newly conquered peoples to accept Mughal rule. While the Mughals did make use of local rulers as tools of military expansion in the short term, their long-term policy depended on the creation of hybrid traditions. This required them to display not just tolerance of, but also support for, local traditions. In return, the elites of these areas did much to encourage acceptance of their rule among conquered populations.

The Mughal “empire” as a multifaceted state

The different regions were all connected through hybrid traditions to the imperial court, and therefore to each other. According to Alam, even though the different regions were culturally and ethnically different from each other with multi-religious and multi-ethnic population, the Mughals political philosophy of assimilation facilitated their authority in all these regions. Inspired by of Sufism and Nasirean ethics that emphasised accommodation, these philosophies formed the bedrock for Mughal state building. Historian Ebba agreeably demonstrates how the Sufi concept of Sulh-i-kull (perfect reconciliation) informed their policy of amalgamating the cultural difference into one universal syncretic Mughal identity. This can be seen throughout integration of many of the local traditions and customs into imperial court. For instance, in 17th century Bengal a large number of pir shrines, which held the tombs of pirs (saints), were visited by large number of Hindus and Muslims alike and was one of the joint worships of adherent to both these religions. Similarly in Punjab, the shrine of pir Farid, known as Baba Farid, was largely visited by Jat population. This demonstrated whilst these two regions were far apart both geographically and in regional culture, they shared a similar hybrid Mughal tradition of Shrine culture with the imperial court. Thus, they formed an identity that linked each other through their link and assimilation to Mughal tra-
ditions. Even Aurangzeb—who had less Sufi influence during his rule—did not get rid of hybrid traditions such as the *Jharoka* which he kept as a symbol in the Dhaka Lal Bagh fort.\(^\text{45}\) This demonstrated even he recognised, despite his personal views, the power culturally assimilated traditions had. Consent was manufactured by the imperial court through the strengthening of existing systems of power and simultaneously opening negotiated space for assimilation with the Mughal court. For instance, in the 17th century, Hindu elites started identifying and even imitating Mughal Persian Culture in both Bengal and Punjab. Sikh Khatri’s started using Persian style in their literature whilst *Rajas* started opening *Pu-jas* to ordinary people.\(^\text{46}\) This clearly showed traditions worked in overcoming regionalism as it allowed for a more diversified society in their assimilation with the Mughal court, thus slowly consenting to one pluralistic Mughal culture. This is supported by Farhat Hassan’s argument that the Mughal state was not a static system but rather an interconnected system where imperial court manufactured consent by the assimilation of local society to the imperial throne. Thus, the different regions may not have shared the exact same traditions or population, but they were all connected by the hybrid traditions with the imperial court, and therefore to each other through a distinct Mughal identity.

**Conclusion**

Hybrid traditions that amalgamated local and Timurid culture created a unique Mughal identity that became embedded within the consciousness of all the emperors’ subjects. This process of amalgamation was itself the product of the unique political philosophy of *Sul-i-Kull* practised by the first six Mughal emperors. The creation of hybrid traditions such as *jharoka-i-darshan* helped to make even the most distant of the empire’s subjects feel a sense of proximity to the centre. Hybrid traditions underpinned Mughal administrative and military policies too. Even administrative layers were a channel through which the court was connected to the localities. The changes made to the ways that the narratives of the *Mangalkavyas* portrayed Mughal policy worked well to embed imperial authority as legitimate, not foreign, rule in the consciousness of the wider population. There is no denying the importance that military force played in the initial stages of conquest or during rebellions, but its greatest impact was felt in the short term. However, it was the creation of hybrid traditions that generated the cooperation, pluralism, and tolerance that uniquely characterised the Mughal Empire. As Subrahmanyam rightly points out, by the 17th century Mughals were seen on the subconscious level as the only true sovereigns across the whole of the subcontinent.\(^\text{47}\) They presided over a unique administration that not only

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\(^{45}\) Asher, “Power and Authority in Mughal India,” 288.


\(^{47}\) Alam and Subrahmanyam, *Mughal State*, 33.
transformed the culture of the subcontinent at the time,
but created traditions so potent that they became em-
bedded in South Asian cultural identity, to the extent
that the remnants of many of these traditions persist to
this day.
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The United States and Their Motives for Orchestrating the 1954 Guatemalan Coup

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Introduction

The 1954 Guatemalan Coup is one of the most widely researched topics in the field of Latin American History. Such interest in the event is due to its wide-ranging historical implications – the direct association between the fall of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz and Guatemalan Democracy with the political and social turmoil which preceded the coup; the inclusion of Guatemala amongst other developing countries affected by U.S. intervention; and the coup’s significance in the radicalization process of many Latin Americans (most famously Che Guevara) amidst the Cold War – making the coup significant in ongoing discourses concerning nation-building, Cold War geopolitics, and imperialism. The history of the coup can be traced back to the beginning of the Guatemalan Revolution in 1944 with the fall of U.S.-backed dictator Jorge Ubico (and his appointed successor Federico Ponce) and the democratic election of the Nationalist Juan Jose Arevalo. The subsequent nationalist fervor present in Guatemala led to increasingly tense relations with the U.S., who was facing pressures from American enterprises, such as the United Fruit Company (UFCO), affected by nationalization efforts and who began suspecting communist infiltration. Relations between the U.S. and Guatemala only worsened with the election of Jacobo Arbenz in 1951 who greatly showed support for the Guatemalan working class and the Campesinos – the largely indigenous peasantry of Guatemala who worked under were exploited by large landowners (latifundistas) and foreign enterprise. Arbenz’s Agrarian Reform Bill – meant to redistribute land to the Campesinos for the purpose of greater equality among the masses, autonomy from foreign enterprise, and transforming Guatemala into a modern-capitalist country – served as the last straw in the path to U.S. intervention. Both the coup’s context and consequential nature raises questions as to the U.S. motivation behind the coup. The U.S. has maintained that any assistance in the coup was in the effort of quelling a rising communist threat within Guatemala, while others have claimed the primary motivation was economic imperialism. The legitimate threat that the Arbenz administration posed to the United States was not the outright creation of a communist regime in the Americas or the loss of United Fruit Company profit, rather it was the loss of a Guatemala under U.S. subjugation that could potentially disrupt the United States’ sphere of influence in the context of the Cold War. Here the notion of economic imperialism becomes valid as U.S. domination over Guatemala depended on the
presence of American enterprises in the area and their control over Guatemalan labor. It is also here that the United States’ willingness to define communism broadly – whether out of naïveté, Cold War delusion, or as a strategic choice – to include nationalism for geo-political purposes becomes apparent revealing that U.S. motivation in orchestrating the coup was linked with their Cold War policy of the time, which was not simply the suppression of communism, but something far more startling: the suppression of non-compliant nation’s autonomy. The suppression of any non-compliant nation’s autonomy which threatened U.S control over their strategically constructed narrative of the Cold War, U.S economic dominion, and U.S hegemonic goals during the Cold War.

**Historiography**

The extensive and pervasive research of the 1954 Guatemalan Coup did not only come about because of its wide-ranging and significant consequences, but in large part due to the continuous declassification and release of C.I.A. documents, sparking renewed interest in the subject, a larger capacity for thorough research and accurate findings, and therefore necessary historical reassessment. The result of consistent new information and reassessments has been a remarkably detailed and cohesive historiography which – by focusing on the different political contexts in which the coup was written about and the increased accessibility to information over time – showcases the vastly different historical perspectives on the coup that have been propagated since the event both clearly and practically. So transparent is this historiography that three major perspectives on the coup are readily identifiable: realist, revisionist, and post-revisionist perspectives (paralleling the widely recognized perspective shifts within Cold War historiography). Although these perspectives may dilute the complexities of individual scholars’ work when not spoken of in-depth, they do provide a cohesive overview of historians’ understanding of the coup throughout the years, making the newest contributions to the field distinguishable and digestible.

**Realist**

The realist perspective encompasses the view that the coup was a legitimate popular revolt by the people of Guatemala in opposition to the supposedly growing communist threat in their country. The realist view also contends that the United States issues with Guatemala had more to deal with power politics rather than economics, and in general subscribes to the worldview that most of the blame for the Cold War should be placed on the Soviet Union. This perspective was the first to emerge within the historiography of the coup (prevailing well into the 1960s) and reflected much of what was the United States’ official narrative concern-

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The realist works of the time are now characterized as the most misinformed given the lack of released classified documents by the U.S., and the use of U.S State Department. filtered information and assertions released at the time.

Furthermore, the groundwork for this perspective took shape even before the coup. The State Department in tandem with United States’ media outlets created a disinformation campaign intended to discredit the economic reforms of the Arbenz administration (in particular, decree 900) through accusations of communism. Subsequently, the prevalence of misinformation was only inflated after the coup with the advent of Operation PBHistory. A collaborative effort between the CIA and Castillo Armas – the leader of the rebel army during the coup and the president of Guatemala after the coup – Operation PBHistory was disinformation campaign against Arbenz’s administration where documents from the Arbenz administration were apprehended, then carefully selected and disseminated to the public to present a distorted view of communist control in Guatemala – further contributing to realist historians’ misconstruction of the coup.

Such a backdrop is notable in the work of realist historians of the time such as John Martz, who wrote Communist Infiltration in Guatemala in 1956 and Ronald Schneider, who was actually given access to PBHistory selected documents directly by the CIA to write Communism in Guatemala that same year. Another notable realist author was journalist Daniel James, who, with his book Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude, laid out the idea that the Guatemalan government was filled with Communists and were attempting Maoist-like reforms. Daniel James’ book is especially significant as it was released before the coup occurred in 1954 not only showcasing what filtered sources historians had on hand at the time, but also suggesting that examination of the realist perspective on the coup (and in general the historiography of the coup) must begin before 1954 to account for the government’s deliberate attempts to misdirect scholars.

Despite such disinformation campaigns and this perspective holding mass prominence in the historiography of the coup, it was only truly embraced by the U.S. whereas the international community (especially Latin American Countries) were much less convinced that Castillo Armas led a popular revolt. Although protests were well documented throughout Latin America, this more suspicious perspective of the United States’ involvement in the coup was not widely accepted outside the U.S.

52 HOLLAND, “Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of SUCCESS.”
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role and motivations was not at the forefront of the history being written about the coup in the 1950s. However, this international perspective on the coup would become more legitimized in American academic circles contributing to the rise of the revisionist view.

Revisionists

Whereas realists abstain from accusing the U.S. of interfering in Guatemala and believe that there was a legitimate communist threat there, revisionists downplay the communist threat in Guatemala portraying Arbenz as an ardent nationalist, believe that the U.S. played a direct role in overthrowing Arbenz’s government, view the U.S. as more responsible for the aggression of the Cold War, and that the United States’ main motivation in assisting in the coup was economic imperialism – primarily to rescue the United Fruit Company from the Agrarian Reform Bill. Although such thoughts had been brewing in Latin America and the international community for years, the perspective did not gain prominence until the 1970s and 1980s as access to documents was given to scholars as part of the Freedom of Information Act, and interviews with prominent U.S. and Guatemalan officials took place creating collective doubt in the realist narrative. It is here that differences in the values of the realist and revisionist perspectives are first glimpsed and the context in which these perspectives emerged becomes important.

The realist perspective emerged during the peak of the Cold War and the Second Red Scare where fear of communism was rampant and the role that the United States played in keeping international normalcy and the capitalist system intact was both highly valued and seemingly righteous. The revisionist view of the Cold War grew prevalent in the post-McCarthy, Vietnam syndrome era of the 1970s where historians began devaluing power politics and taking interest in dependency theory – the concept that poor countries grow dependent on the selling of their raw materials to wealthier countries who exploit them by creating an economic partnership in which the poorer countries rely on their rich buyers – as well as the conditions of Cold War-affected developing countries. In the case of the Guatemalan coup, enough time had passed to assess that the coup was having horrific consequences on Guatemalan society and democracy – with the rise of dictators and the beginning of the Guatemalan Civil War – and a larger focus was being put on the United Fruit Company’s control of Guatemalan land and workers in historical reexaminations. It was with the unfolding of the coup’s effect on Guatemala in a Cold-War disillusioned climate that the U.S.-critical revisionist perspective began gaining prominence.

These historical and ideological understandings provide context for the peak of the revisionist view’s popularity, which was the release of what is still the

55 Cullather, “(ESTIMATED PUB DATE) OPERATION PBSUCCESS; THE UNITED STATES AND GUATEMALA 1952- | CIA FOIA (Foia.Cia.Gov),” 85-86.
most widely read and circulated source on the Guatemalan Coup: Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer’s *Bitter Fruit*, released in 1982. The book asserts that the United States government’s main motivation for operation PBSuccess was saving the United Fruit Company (UFCO) from the Agrarian Reform Bill, and that the accusations of communism were exaggerated to cover up these nefarious motives.\(^{57}\) *Bitter Fruit* especially puts a focus on the relations between the State Department and UFCO officials, specifically that of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles (both of whom largely shaped Eisenhower’s Cold War policy and orchestrated many of the covert operations which took place during the Cold War) and their personal interest in the company (John once working as part of the law firm who represented the UFCO and Allen working on the board of the company). Furthermore, the book undermines both the communist influence and view of communist influence within the Guatemalan government and over Arbenz.\(^{58}\)

**Post-Revisionist**

Schlesinger and Kinzer’s revisionist take on the Guatemalan coup coincided with the release of another notable account on the coup, also in 1982: Richard H. Immerman’s *The CIA in Guatemala* which served as one of the most noteworthy post-revisionist takes on the coup.\(^{59}\) Although similar to Bitter Fruit in its critique of the U.S. and its claim that there was not a legitimate Communist threat in Guatemala, Immerman contends that the United States’ intervention in Guatemala was not motivated primarily by economic imperialism, but instead by the authentic belief that there was a Communist threat in Guatemala caused by a misreading of the Guatemalan situation stemming from the United States confusing communism and nationalism exacerbated by cultural divide.\(^{60}\) The differing conclusions in *Bitter Fruit* and *The CIA in Guatemala* exemplify the split between revisionist and post-revisionist thought as well as the growing nuance of discourse surrounding the Guatemalan coup.

It was at the peak of the revisionist perspective’s popularity that the post-revisionist perspective emerged. In many ways, the post-revisionist perspective constitutes the equilibrium position between the realist and revisionist views. Each post-revisionist scholar has their own differing nuanced views and tends to come to different conclusions, but they are tied together under similar presumptions: that the two superpowers hold equal blame for the Cold War, that the United States did not know what to make of communism in Guatemala (overtly confusing it with nationalism), and that the UFCO and economic imperialism took a sec-
ondary role as motivation for the coup. In the case of Immerman, his claim focuses on the United States misconstruing nationalism for communism and that the Agrarian Reform Bill was meant to dispel communism, not promote it as the United States thought.

However, in the ongoing dialogue of the coup, historian Piero Gleijeses came to a different conclusion than Immerman in his book *Shattered Hope*, released in 1992. Gleijeses agrees in large part with Immerman’s claim that economic imperialism and the United Fruit Company were not the principal motivations for U.S. intervention in Guatemala. He explains that it was a mixture of “imperial hubris, security concerns, and economic interests” that shaped U.S. motivation to intervene and that as the situation in Guatemala developed, economic concerns increasingly shaped United States policy as communism increasingly shaped Guatemalan policy. However, Gleijeses does not believe that it was confusion that dominated the United States approach to Guatemala, but instead their want for hemispherical hegemony. Gleijeses’ account is also especially notable for the wide-ranging interviews he conducted with C.I.A. officials, Guatemalan army officials, and ex-members of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT). The most important of these interviews was with Maria Villanova, wife of Jacobo Arbenz, and Jose Manuel Fortuny, founder of the PGT and friend of Arbenz, whom both revealed Arbenz’s deep sympathy for the communist movement, as well as the hope that agrarian reform would help the communist movement in Guatemala (in direct contradiction to Immerman’s claim).

These notable paradigm shifts in the historiography of the Guatemalan coup showcase the ongoing discourse surrounding the event and the benefits that both review and hindsight have in making history more translucent, nuanced, and prevalent. Examination of this historiography is especially paramount to ongoing evaluations of the United States’ main motivations for orchestrating the 1954 Guatemalan Coup, as it provides necessary context which illuminates different perspectives on the coup, as well as expands the possibility of constructive conclusions and synthesis that increasingly accounts for various angles and biases. Considering the historiography of the event, reevaluation of the United States’ driving forces in plotting the coup with a larger focus put on both the importance of Guatemalan labor to U.S. domination of the region and the value that such regional domination held to the U.S. seems appropriate.

**Communism In Guatemala**

When factoring the immense threat that the rising appeal of communism had on the American Empire and the ideology of the capitalist world, U.S. antago-

nism towards anything seemingly sympathetic towards communism, critical of capitalism, or against American interests is expected in the tense and paranoid times of the Cold War. To an obvious extent, it makes sense that the open nature of the communists in Guatemala was worrying to the United States amid the Second Red Scare, but how palpable was the communist threat in Guatemala really? To say that communists did not exist in Guatemala at the time of the 1954 coup, that they were not active, and that they did not make up Arbenz’s inner circle are all inaccurate misconceptions. communism was allowed in Guatemala and communists had open, active, and prevalent roles in the Guatemalan government during Arbenz’s presidency, so it is not hard to conceive that from an outsider’s view – say the United States’ view – there was a communist threat in Guatemala. This conclusion, however, is also inaccurate as from the current historical record it seems evident that, despite there being communists in important and notable positions in the government, as well as an active communist party within the country, the communists did not enjoy majority support in the country – whether in the government or among the masses – to successfully take over in the foreseeable future.65

To measure the actual capacity and strength of communism in Guatemala, one must evaluate communist strength during the presidency of Juan Jose Arevalo and the formation of the PGT, which was the Guatemalan Communist Party. The election of Arevalo and the creation of a new constitution granted the Guatemalan masses unprecedented social liberties which allowed for both freedoms of expression and organization. However, the formation of a communist party, as well as communist rhetoric, was both prohibited and punishable (although punishment, in general, was lax). This led many communists to operate within the major political parties of the time as well as in labor organizations where they could legally (although not openly) push their agendas.66

The most significant examples of this came from future PGT leaders Victor Manuel Gutierrez, who headed the labor organization Confederacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala (CTG), and Jose M. Fortuny, who was secretary-general of the Partido Accion Revolucionaria (PAR) – the most left-leaning of the political parties in congress at the time – until 1949.67 The high-ranking status of both of these communists was quite unsettling to the United States given the importance of urban-working class support to communism. This penetration into the labor unions in conjunction with the formation of the Escuela Claridad (a labor school that taught Marxism that was shut down by Arevalo in 1946), convinced the United States that the communists were beginning to have substantial in-

65 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 123, 141-148.
66 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 40, 76-77, 80-81.
fluence over labor.\textsuperscript{68}

Furthermore, both of these men became active leaders in the PGT which was formed underground in 1949 but soon went public in 1950 where both its tribunal (\textit{Octubre}) and Marxist-teaching school (the Jacobo Sanchez school) were swiftly shut down by Arevalo’s government.\textsuperscript{69} The underground PGT during Arevalo’s presidency consisted of less than fifty members in 1949 and were inadequately versed in Marxism given that Guatemala was something of an “intellectual desert.”\textsuperscript{70} Although the communists were actively working within the labor organizations and the revolutionary parties to spread their influence, Arevalo’s consistent crackdown on them, their small numbers, as well as their indistinguishable role from the nationalists ensured that their influence stayed low.

However, under the presidency of Jacobo Arbenz, the communists began gaining far more prominence as the past restrictions placed on them were lifted. This made the PGT a legitimate and recognizable party that was free to participate in the Guatemalan Congress. It was here that the influence of the communists grew substantially. Such was solidified with the passing of Decree 900 into law, where an American analysis on the strength of communism within Guatemala explains that the bill formed a hierarchy of commissions – a national commission, department commissions, and Municipio commissions – which allowed the communists to begin exerting larger amounts of influence in different regions, especially near the bigger cities.\textsuperscript{71} Furthermore, the effectiveness of the communists in congress was noted by the same document which reported that the communists were ‘dedicated,’’ hard working,’’ and willing to do “the tedious job of drafting bills and decrees” making them exemplary policy-makers in comparison to the other parties who were characterized as self-interested.\textsuperscript{72} This not only meant that the communists held a generally clean reputation which in tandem with their agenda led them to high positions of power in the agrarian commissions but also made the communists somewhat indispensable in the Guatemalan Congress creating circumstances where the communists could be looked upon favorably. However, it was thought that the communists did not hold enough influence to oppose the other parties “acting in concert” (a likely scenario given the other party’s suspicion of the communists) which frames much of the communists’ success in congress as being the result of unanimous or majority agreeance on serious issues – highlighting the similarities between the communists


\textsuperscript{69} Gleijeses, \textit{Shattered Hope}, 80-81.

\textsuperscript{70} Gleijeses, \textit{Shattered Hope}, 40, 76-77.


\textsuperscript{72} “COMMUNIST STRENGTH, METHODS OF OPERATION/ADMINISTRATION OF LAND REFORM/POSSIBLE | CIA FOIA (Foia.Cia.Gov), 3-4.”
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and the nationalists’ agenda – rather than their diligent nature or uniquely communistic ideas.

What could be considered the most alarming influence that the communists held in Guatemala came neither from congress, nor from the Labor Movement, but instead from their relationship with President Jacobo Arbenz. Although Arevalo occasionally tolerated the communists, he was ultimately staunchly anti-communist (even disrupting the underground communist party in 1947). Arbenz on the other hand became close friends with many communists and Fortuny even served as one of Arbenz’s primary advisers and speechwriters. The aforementioned declassified C.I.A. document even makes note of this, but largely attributes Arbenz’s reliance on the communists on the notion that he was a politically uninterested military man who could not be bothered by the semantics of politics and therefore both solicited and appreciated the help of Fortuny.

Interviews with Fortuny as well as Arbenz’s wife Maria Villanova, however, reveals that Arbenz had come to heavily sympathize with Marxism and with the communists. Arbenz viewed the Agrarian Reform Bill under a Marxist lens believing it was an essential step in the process of transforming Guatemala’s feudal economic system into a modern capitalist system on the way to creating a communist society. Whereas it has been speculated that Decree 900 was supposed to suppress communism and intellectually stemmed from the U.S. New Deal, this seems to hold untrue under this account. This is not to say however that Arbenz’s motivations were not nationalistic. Arbenz recognized that the process of economic development that needed to take place within Guatemala for it to successfully become a communist society would take decades. Furthermore, the PGT still had no formal connection to the Soviet Union and Arbenz had attempted to keep good relations with the United States as made evident in a documented meeting between Arbenz and U.S. official Richard C. Patterson before Arbenz’s election where Arbenz expresses concern for the two country’s less than amicable relationship which would only turn worse after his election. Due to this, it makes more sense to cast Arbenz as a nationalist with communist aspirations as his main motivation for reform still stemmed from
the want to create a more self-sufficient, prosperous, and equal Guatemala.

Altogether, though, does this mean that there was a communist threat in Guatemala? Despite the PGT growing in prominence, Arbenz holding communist sympathies, and the Agrarian Reform Bill possibly leading to the Campesinos supporting the PGT, it is an exaggeration to say that there was a legitimate or urgent communist presence within Guatemala. The prevailing ideological stance within Guatemala was that of nationalism, which defined the policies of the revolutionary parties and the actions of the labor unions. The communists were successful ultimately because their agenda largely lined up with that of the nationalists, but this would also mean any credit given to the communists would be given to the nationalists two-fold – as such would be the case for the largely apolitical Campesinos – meaning communist influence was still minimal. Furthermore, the communists had no plans of overthrowing the government as they saw it more useful to work through the mechanizations of the current democracy given their lack of popular support, the arbitrary nature of the endeavor considering Guatemala’s economic state, and the anti-communist nature of the army which would not have tolerated a communist takeover. The communists were much more preoccupied with successfully transitioning Guatemala into different economic stages – an endeavor that could take decades. Although Cold War delusion may be enough to explain U.S. belief in an actual communist threat it is far more likely the U.S. was instead motivated by the threat the Guatemalan government posed to their control of Guatemalan labor.

**Labor in Guatemala**

The nationalist and pro-labor reforms of the Arbenz and Arevalo administration certainly played a large role in provoking U.S. intervention. Although Arevalo did not commit to nearly as many drastic reforms as Arbenz did, it was under his administration that suspicion and contempt from the U.S. against Guatemala first appeared due to the creation of the Labor Code. Matters were only made worse under Arbenz who enacted the largest and most impactful reform in Guatemala: Decree 900 (otherwise known as the agrarian reform bill). Initially, this reform may seem innocuous to all except for Guatemalans, but for the United States the reform was quite alarming as the largest landholder and employer in Guatemala at the time was the United Fruit Company: an American corporation. Although PBSuccess is often framed as a response to protect the United Fruit Company and American profit, it is perhaps more accurate to view PBSuccess as a response to the threat that the agrarian reform bill, the nationalist fervor of the country, and the rise of the Labor Movement posed to U.S. authority over Guatemalan labor.

The situation of labor in Guatemala correlates directly with the dynamic between the different socio-

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80 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 123, 141-148.
economic classes within the country. The rural Campesinos were the poorest socioeconomic class holding little social standing and being largely apolitical. They were predominantly indigenous and made up the economic foundation of Guatemalan society (acting as the essential workers in the banana and coffee industry which were Guatemala’s largest exports). Next in social standing were the urban masses, comprised of the middle and working class which was largely made up of ladinos (mestizos) and represented the most politically active socioeconomic class during the Guatemalan Revolution. Most members of the Labor Movement, the PGT, and the new political elite came from the urban masses, and nationalism largely defined their political ideology (politicians often appealed to this class for political clout rather than the Campesinos). Of the highest social standing in Guatemala were the latifundistas or the landed elite whose land the Campesinos worked on. These wealthy landowners were mainly of right-wing orientation meaning they were staunch opponents of land redistribution, the Labor Movement, and both Arevalo and Arbenz, as well as supporters of the United States and authoritarian figures who would protect their interests.

Inequality within the country becomes evident when one considers that 2% percent of the population controlled 72% of Guatemala’s arable land (of which only 12% was under cultivation) and that the UFCO was the largest landholder, employer, and exporter in Guatemala meaning power and economic reward in Guatemala was consolidated to a few social elites and an American enterprise. Furthermore, 88% of the farming units only owned 14% of the land meaning that the Campesinos (who made up approximately 70% of the population) widely suffered from an extremely poor standard of living (a problem shared by the working class) suggesting that the country was in desperate need of agrarian reform. It was this poor standard of living as well as the lack of control for Guatemalans over their own country’s industries and land which prompted the rise of nationalism during the Guatemalan Revolution as an effort to reclaim the country’s wealth. For the Americans, it was this threat to their control of Guatemalan labor which effectively gave them control of Guatemala through dependence on American enterprise that ultimately served as the impetus for intervention.

Labor reform began with the election of Arevalo when newfound liberties allowed for greater freedoms of speech and organization. It was under Arevalo’s administration that the Labor Movement was able to make substantial progress with the creation of the CTG and the Federacion Sindical de Guatemala (FSG) – the two largest labor confederations in Guatemala with somewhere around 90,000 members combined

by 1950 – which were devoted to pushing for political and social change on behalf of the Labor Movement.\textsuperscript{63} These two confederations lobbied successfully for the creation and passing of what became the Labor Code in May of 1947 which most importantly gave workers the right to unionize (although agriculture unions were heavily restricted), protected workers from unfair dismissals, and gave workers the right to strike.\textsuperscript{64} It was the Labor Code of 1947 which would solidify the opposition of both the latifundistas and the UFCO against the Guatemalan government. The UFCO claimed that the Labor Code was discriminatory as it required only large landowners with more than 500 permanent workers to give its workers the same rights as industrial workers and led the UFCO to seek the assistance of the U.S. State Department hoping they could mount political pressure against the Guatemalan government to revoke the Labor Code.\textsuperscript{85} It was during this time of imploring the State Department that the UFCO would claim the government “was subjected to communistic influences emanating from outside Guatemala,” which was the first blatant accusation of communist infiltration of the Guatemalan government made to the U.S..\textsuperscript{86}

Before the passing of the Labor Code, the United States had viewed Guatemala with little concern. In a C.I.A. intelligence report from April 1947 analyzing Soviet objectives in Latin America, little mention is made of Guatemala other than its inclusion in a list of Latin American countries with “no communist parties” while mentioning that “all of the important” Latin American republics have influential communist parties suggesting that communism in Guatemala was hardly considered an issue especially in comparison to other Latin American countries.\textsuperscript{87} However, analyzing a Department of State report on the Guatemalan situation from May of 1950, it makes specific reference to the UFCO’s accusation of “discriminatory” policy in the Labor Code and refers to the communist influence as “considerable” and something which “should not be underestimated.”\textsuperscript{88}

The UFCO’s accusation of communism and the United States subsequent perspective shift acts as a missing link in understanding the U.S. motivation in Guatemala. It reveals how U.S. interest in protecting its enterprise and its evaluation of communism in Guatemala had all to do with the threat that rising nationalism and the Labor Movement posed to U.S. authority.

\textsuperscript{83} Gleijeses, \textit{Shattered Hope}, 40.
\textsuperscript{84} Gleijeses, \textit{Shattered Hope}, 41.
\textsuperscript{85} Gleijeses, \textit{Shattered Hope}, 94.
\textsuperscript{86} “Guatemalan Labor Code and Possible Discrimination against United Fruit Company” cited in Gleijeses, 96.
of Guatemala. The Labor Code and the other pro-labor policies of Arevalo, however, still did little to help the Campesinos meaning that no decisive harm had yet truly been done to U.S. control of Guatemalan labor and by extension Guatemala itself.

The threat that the Guatemalan government posed to U.S. control of its labor, however, was legitimized with the election of Jacobo Arbenz. While Arevalo had helped make substantial progress in the Labor Movement in the urban areas, he had done little for the Campesinos. Arbenz, on the other hand, would embark on the largest nationalization efforts the country had ever seen which included modernizing the country’s physical infrastructure and most importantly agrarian reform. The Agrarian Reform Bill or Decree 900 was passed into law in 1952 and redistributed uncultivated farmland from large landholdings to the largely indigenous Campesinos to promote equity and transform “serfs into citizens.” The bill allowed the Guatemalan government to expropriate uncultivated land from private landowners – with the number varying by the amount of uncultivated land owned by each landowner – who would be compensated with government bonds. This would lead to the UFCO losing 234,000 acres in March 1953 and then 173,000 acres in February 1954 with the government assessing the land’s value as $1,185,000 as declared by the UFCO (this was controversial as the UFCO purposefully undervalued the land for tax purpose and claimed after expropriation that the land was worth $19,355,000). The rebuilding of the country’s physical infrastructure would further diminish the United States’ ability to exert control over Guatemala as it constituted the creation of a large road network (challenging the International Railways of Central America’s [IRCA] monopoly), the construction of a new port in the bay of Santo Tomas (meaning less trade would go through the IRCA/UFCO controlled Puerto Barrios), and the construction of a hydroelectric plant.

The implications of all these reforms were effectively the loss of U.S. control over Guatemalan labor and industry as Guatemala worked towards becoming a self-reliant county. This motivated the U.S. to act to protect the UFCO not because the U.S. particularly cared about protecting UFCO profits or land, but because it cared about keeping control of Guatemalan labor. Control of Guatemalan labor meant control of Guatemala’s economy. It was useful to the United States that Guatemala remained underdeveloped and dependent on them not only for profit but also to assure the security of their empire which the U.S. felt was endangered with the rise of the Cold War. The realist view of U.S. Cold War policy characterizes U.S. action as a response to communist encroachment to protect freedom. However, U.S. Cold War policy may be better characterized by – as exemplified by the 1954 Coup – the need to keep hegemonic

89 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 149.
90 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 164.
91 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 165.
power at all costs regardless of a communist threat (a policy influenced by imperial hubris and paranoia).

Hegemony

Given that the 1954 Guatemalan Coup was a byproduct of the larger Cold War, the discussion of ideology should not be ignored. The Cold War Era saw the vehement and often destructive grab for power and influence by the two superpowers over developing countries which created a dichotomous globe. Developing countries were heavily pressured to align with either the Soviet or American bloc as a strategic move to receive the proper resources and trade agreements necessary to develop. But what about countries whose political philosophy and direction were less defined by capitalism or communism and more defined by nationalism and sovereignty? In the case of Guatemala, it was Operation PBSuccess. In other words, U.S. intervention. This poses the question of whether the U.S. legitimately confused the nationalist movement as communistic or if they simply defined any action against U.S. interest or hegemony communistic to justify intervention. The result of this discourse, therefore, involves the question of if U.S. Cold War policy was about suppressing communism or suppressing any threat to U.S. global dominance.

One of the most notable examples of Guatemala’s threat to U.S. hegemony involved Arevalo’s involvement in the Caribbean Legion. The Caribbean Legion was a group of Latin American revolutionaries devoted to overthrowing dictatorships in the Caribbean with aspirations for a united Central America.\(^92\) It was after a botched attempt to overthrow Trujillo in the Dominican Republic during 1947 that Arevalo (and by extension Guatemala) became the leading supporter of the Legion. That same year, Arevalo helped write the Caribbean Pact which called for the overthrow of the governments of the authoritarian governments of Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Guatemala transshipped materiel and hosted personnel during the Legion’s assistance of the rebel forces in Costa Rica’s Civil War in 1948 and the botched invasion attempts of Nicaragua that same year and the Dominican Republic the next year.\(^93\) It was Guatemala’s investment into foreign intervention that angered the United States as the displacement of Central American dictators would change the power dynamics of the region – a negative for the United States who had grown friendly with and had come to rely on these dictators as subservient allies who kept the status quo.

Arevalo’s involvement in the Caribbean Legion would therefore not go unnoticed by the U.S. as it was an example of Guatemala threatening stability in a region whose state and leadership was favorable to and willing to be under the jurisdiction of the U.S. However, it is important to note that the Caribbean Legion was

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not communist in nature. The legion’s ideology was essentially comprised of two main ideas: pro-democracy and anti-authoritarian. Despite communism not being a part of the Legion’s goals, the U.S. still chose to use Arevalo’s participation in the legion as evidence of communist support. Some may argue that this was out of confusion, but the U.S. was aware of the Legion’s goals. The U.S. viewed the Legion’s activities as a security threat due to the nature of its activities almost inevitably destabilizing the region which – in tandem with the advent of social freedoms allowing for the rise of anti-imperialism and nationalism (Guatemala) – would weaken U.S. hegemony and status in the Cold War. This is in step with U.S. Cold War policy at the time which was willing to keep authoritarian regimes in power and freedoms suppressed to avoid the larger threat of communist encroachment into their empire while also serving as an example of the U.S. defining any threat to hegemony as communistic to justify future action.

It is in conjunction with the Caribbean Legion that the social reforms of Arevalo would reveal how little communism in Guatemala mattered in motivating the U.S. to overthrow the government. During Arevalo’s administration, it was his nationalist and pro-labor reforms that brought him disdain from the United Fruit Company and the United States. Such action against an American enterprise boded poorly for the United States and (for similar concerns they had with the Caribbean Legion) they feared the autonomy of what they considered a recklessly nationalistic country to their control of the region. Arbenz’s agrarian reform and investment into physical infrastructure consequently served as the breaking point for the U.S.’s tolerance of Guatemalan autonomy as it presented a double threat.

For one, the nationalization efforts would cause the United States to lose its grasp in what was to them the most problematic country in Central America. This meant that Guatemala would no longer be a strict subordinate of the United States. It would no longer be a Banana Republic. This was essentially the point of Agrarian reform, to remove both U.S. influence over the country and to help transition the country into a capitalist economic system. The second threat that such a reform posed to the United States was the domino effect that reforms and success in Guatemala could have across the region. This was the true threat that the United States saw in the nationalization efforts of Guatemala, as by reclaiming its industry and becoming an independent, self-reliant country Guatemala could become prosperous without the help of the United States. The U.S. feared a prospering Guatemala as that would lead to them gaining more influence in the region and the possibility for a slew of popular (or even orchestrated) revolutions to occur and the consequent establishment of anti-imperialist, nationalist, Guatemalan-style democracies in Central America or worse: communist states. Such a reality was not so unlikely to the U.S.

given Guatemala’s past actions with the Caribbean Legion and the possibility that through agrarian reform they could become the most prosperous state in the region.\textsuperscript{95}

When looking at the Guatemalan situation from this perspective, the importance of communism to U.S. motivation to intervene is greatly diminished and nationalism is revealed as the more accurate reason for intervention. Although many historians have argued that the United States had confused nationalism and communism in Guatemala which led to the coup, it seems more likely that the United States simply used the presence of communists in Guatemala to justify the overthrow of a government that would have been problematic to exerting control over the region of Central America even if there were no communists.

The case for this can be made when one sees how closely aligned the nationalists’ and the communists’ agendas were. The United States’ problem with these policies was not simply the fact that communists supported them, but that these policies were detrimental to U.S. control over Guatemala. A CIA report titled “Summary of communist Labor” from January 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1949 is filled with a list of communist objectives calling for policies such as “improved wages in relation to the high living costs,” “the fixing of a minimum wage,” and “the right of the Campesinos to possess the land upon which they work.”\textsuperscript{96} These are also all objectives in line with the wants of the nationalists and the Labor Movement. These are also identical to New-Deal progressive policies employed by the U.S. during the Great Depression, so it makes sense that developing countries would follow suit. The C.I.A., however, chose to view and portray these ideas as communistic – an accusation that caused strife in the heavily U.S.-influenced hemisphere – while also undermining any good that the reforms were doing for Guatemala.\textsuperscript{97}

This essentially placed Guatemala in a double bind where they could either enact reforms that would increase the standard of living, make the country more self-reliant, and help transition the country into a modern capitalist economy at the expense of making an enemy of the United States, or they could remain a safe but an impoverished puppet of the United States. The Guatemalans were only taking what were the preconceived steps thought to lead to prosperity, but the United States could not allow this as it was at the expense of their empire.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Ultimately, the United States’ main motivation in orchestrating the 1954 Guatemalan coup was to maintain hegemonic dominance over the region of Central America. The nationalists and the Labor Move-

\textsuperscript{95} Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 167–70.
\textsuperscript{97} “PERSONAL POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF PRESIDENT ARBENZ/POSSIBILITY OF A LEFT-WING | CIA FOIA (Foia.Cia.Gov),” 2–3.
The United States and Their Motives for Orchestrating the 1954 Guatemalan Coup

ment were instrumental in loosening U.S. grip over the country as it led to the U.S. losing control of Guatemalan labor and Guatemalan self-sufficiency. communism certainly existed within Guatemala, but the threat that Guatemala posed to U.S. hegemony would be present even if there were no communists as it was the progressive and nationalistic reforms themselves that took place during the Guatemalan Revolution (that were necessary for the country’s betterment) rather than communists’ presence and assistance in stimulating such reform that was of legitimate concern to the U.S. Although essential to helping carry out these reforms, the communists were only one part of a much larger and tangible nationalist phenomenon and threat. This means that communism was simply a pretext to U.S. intervention which was instead motivated by the need to control the Guatemalan economy to maintain hegemony in a region susceptible to a domino effect of revolutionary activity and nationalist sentiment. Autonomous countries threatened the American empire’s dominance and sphere of influence, something which was intolerable during the Cold War, and it is not hard to find more examples of the United States intervening in nationalistic governments – who wanted good relations with the U.S. – that were deemed problematic. Such was the case with the government emplaced by Cuban Revolutionary Fidel Castro after the Cuban Revolution whose initial attempts to create good relations with the United States were met with a cold shoulder and eventually an invasion attempt in 1961. Much of the same can also be said about the Prime Minister of Iran from 1951-1953 Mohammad Mossadegh who was overthrown in a U.S. and British backed coup in 1953 after he nationalized the British dominated oil industry and allowed for communist participation in government – a story which shares many parallels with the overthrow of Arbenz. These cases showcase the minimal attempts made on behalf of the United States to form good relations with independent-minded countries – actions seemingly only explained by the United States’ perspective that maintaining a secure hold of their sphere of influence and empire during the Cold War was only possible when developing countries within their sphere of influence were strictly subservient. Nuance in political thought or autonomy could not be allowed. The implications of such a policy can be seen today in Guatemala. Political instability and state violence define the country, and the standard of living is extremely low.98 When reassessing the Guatemalan Revolution, it becomes apparent that the government of Jacobo Arbenz was Guatemala’s most proactive government due to his willingness to enact necessary reform giving hope to the Guatemalan people. The collapse of his government would signify the loss of that hope which to this day has never completely returned.

Primary Sources


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Secondary Sources


There are notable contradictions in how many 19th century Latin American societies articulated what was --and was not-- acceptable with respect to death practices and rituals, and women often found themselves at the center of these inconsistencies. In other words, ideas about “proper” behavior surrounding death existed in tension with each other, and women were often subjected to these shifting ideologies, all of which sought to control their behavior. This article explores the following three areas in which there were conflicting state and social agendas that existed simultaneously about how to mourn: the increasing rejection of baroque manifestations of mourning, but the expectation that individuals nonetheless adhere to such expressions, the notion that widowhood was objectionable, but that this status and its rituals be strictly honored, and the expectation that women be absent from funerals and other sites of collective processing of death, but the acknowledged need for their leadership.

What seems to be a consistent thread is the emphasis on “appearances,” or on displaying a desirable image of mourning practices and of the self, which was a means for the state and Church to delineate the “correct” kind of propriety across Latin America.

Because the Roman Catholic Church and civic authorities in many countries such as Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and Mexico in the 19th century increasingly condemned excessive, baroque expressions of affliction, they began regulating public displays of grief, especially those by women. This surge in regimentation fit into a larger trend in which Latin American societies were attempting to delineate the spaces of the dead more clearly, and establish how the living could interact with them. Authorities in countries such Chile did this by relocating cemeteries from urban centers to their outskirts, and often cited public health concerns to do so. At the same time, baroque traditions still had a grasp on society, such that funerary pomp and the cult of the individual continued to be valued in funerals and mourning. These conflicting cultural and state projects, then, might be formulated as the pervasive critique and regulation of the baroque versus its cultural persistence.

There had indeed already been a long history of criticism of the Catholic Church’s lavish funerary and burial traditions. In the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, Spanish civic legislation --extended to the American

viceroyalties-- sought to regulate the Church’s pomp and excessive prices for burial rights. In the 19th century, such critiques seemed only to grow in the context of Latin America; what was significant, however, was that the Church, in some instances, now mirrored the state’s concerns. The “vanity of the living” in funerary practices, for example, was criticized by the Church in Chile when in 1892, to avoid “excessive ostentation,” the Archbishop of Santiago, Mariano Casanova y Casanova, banned the decorative placement of crowns made of artificial flowers on tombs during religious services. This kind of sentiment stands in stark contrast to the Archbishop’s own language regarding mourning 30 years before, which encouraged public displays of grief. After the tragic fire in the church of the Compañía de Jesús on December 8, 1863, Casanova as presbyter gave the funeral prayer, treating and affirming the “[t]he crying, the deep groans, the tender supplications, the lugubrious songs, the mourning dress…” as just expressions of grief.

In this particular case, the scale of death and loss was enormous (See Appendix, Fig. 1), perhaps driving Casanova to articulate outlets that were sorely needed by the public in this unique event. Nonetheless, the contrast between the two positions serves to demonstrate that there was a transition in how Church officials perceived mourning, which mapped onto the state’s analogous condemnations. Casanova’s rule on tomb decorations echoed previous moves by the Chilean state when it heavily regulated mourning practices in its 1821 reglamento, which announced a new national cemetery. In the reglamento’s provisional version, for instance, in order to check “ostentatious shows of wealth,” it fined individuals 500 pesos if they accompanied the casket to the cemetery.

Along with scrutinizing funerals and burials, the authorities monitored a central kind of mourning paraphernalia, namely, widows’ luto, or black mourning dress that varied stylistically (See Appendix, Fig. 3), and which served not only to publicly honor a late husband, but to express how the wearer was still his property, even in death. While luto applied to both men and women who lost spouses, it was highly socially emphasized for women, and varied in form according to socioeconomic status. That is, while women of lower statuses wore a more simple luto, wealthy women often donned luxurious black fabrics and accessories, which was exactly the kind of “ostentation” that the state was attempting to regulate. Not only were such efforts central in attempting to reduce the “spectacle” in mourning, but they also became a tool to re-

100 Marco Antonio León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana: Los Espacios De La Muerte En Santiago De Chile, 1883-1932 (Santiago de Chile: DIBAM, 1997), 25-26.
101 León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana, 163.
duce women’s freedom of expression. In Guatemala, a Royal Decree in 1796 laid out how widows were to approach luto, stipulating that it should last no more than six months.\textsuperscript{107} In 1844, a similar decree by a governor in Buenos Aires specified that the only acceptable expression of luto was a black bracelet on the left wrist.\textsuperscript{108} While the latter example perhaps emerged out of an economizing strategy,\textsuperscript{109} it nonetheless indicates a preoccupation about the excesses that mourning rituals were prompting. Women and the power they might wield both through their displays of grief and the expenses for luto materials posed a threat to the order of society. The growing restrictions on “excess,” then, facilitated a heightened control of women.

Besides the regimentation of luto, women’s public displays of grief in Chile, Mexico, Argentina, and Peru were discouraged, such that the “displacement of female mourning from public to private spaces in the nineteenth century was commonplace.”\textsuperscript{110} In the same vein, Chile’s aforementioned 1821 reglamento encouraged women’s “emotional display of grief” to occur in domestic spaces, and targeted planíderas --also known as lloronas-- or hired weepers, who were always women.\textsuperscript{111} In Mexico and other Latin American countries, Manuales de urbanidad, or manuals on civility, like that of Venezuelan Manuel Carreño published in 1853, advocated particular kinds of mourning behavior within the domestic sphere, such as serenity, introspection, and silence.\textsuperscript{112} All of this licensing indeed reflected a general shifting ideology that valued the individual’s own process of intense and private mourning, set apart from hierarchical public life\textsuperscript{113} and from the strictures of the Church, but even though this emerging preference for private mourning was generalized, women seemed to bear the brunt of its consequences most intensely.

Despite this cultural shift, stemming mostly from the Church and state’s rejection of grandiose displays of mourning, what many people on the ground wished to do to remember their loved ones was, as mentioned, often in line with previous baroque traditions. That is, the baroque culture of ceremony and of placing special value on the deceased individual remained deeply embedded in society. The emphasis on the image of the individual, for instance, fed into grand commemorations of the dead as well as into a culture of “the cult of the dead” and thus lavish funerary decorations and displays became popular.\textsuperscript{114} Tombs decorated

\begin{thebibliography}{11}
\bibitem{109} Roca, “Las mujeres ante la muerte,” 8.
\bibitem{110} Melstrom, “Death and the Body Politic,” 77.
\bibitem{111} Melstrom, “Death and the Body Politic,” 76-77, 83.
\bibitem{113} León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana, 32.
\bibitem{114} León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana, 163.
\end{thebibliography}
with crowns of flowers were significant ritualized components of funerals, or “funeral-shows,” as one scholar puts it. Remembering the virtues and feats of the dead became central in “post-mortem honorability”-informed rituals. One such ritual was the placing of a photograph of the dead --taken during the individual’s life or sometimes death-- on the tomb. In practice, these discrepancies meant that Latin American societies reproached extravagant mourning practices but at the same time expected, or even required them. In this push and pull of demands, one can imagine the kind of balance and composure women in particular had to develop to negotiate the prescriptions they faced from the Church, state, and cultural norms.

A second critical contradiction that flourished in 19th century Latin America regarding mourning was tied to the status of widowhood: it was broadly stigmatized, but at the same time there were rigid expectations that this status be observed properly. While the widow was often diminished for being unmarried and was considered less desirable than single women in the marriage market, she was also not given freedom to remove that status very easily, for she was societally expected to remain a widow for a considerable amount of time.

In Guatemala, widows experienced significant discrimination in their attempts to remarry, and across Latin America widows often “waited an average of fifteen months longer to remarry than their male counterparts, most likely due to societal pressures to maintain their state of mourning for a longer period of time.” Being left without a spouse was “preponderantly a female phenomenon,” according to data surveying seven cities in Chile, which demonstrate that men in the late 18th century had considerably lower rates of “definitive singleness,” or of single status through the rest of their lives, than women. At least in the context of this data, the gendered trends of widowhood are palpable and cannot be simply dismissed as tropes from the collective imaginary about elder women being more often single than their male counterparts.

In addition to social prejudice, widows often faced dire financial situations, and in the rural world even more so. As a result of this instability, they were often seen in a suspicious light by the population because, for instance, they were assumed to be susceptible to the temptation of theft. This mistrust was evident in the story of a poor Guatemalan widow Mercedes Obregón, who was falsely accused of stealing a packet

115 León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana,159, 162.
116 León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana,164.
117 León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana, 163-164.
118 Palomo de Lewin, “Por Ser una Pobre Viuda,” 8.
containing jewelry. In this way, the status of widowhood permanently carried a suggestion of inadequacy and even danger. Of course, even in the face of these realities, many widows were able to exercise a certain amount of power and agency, including by owning and running businesses, factories, and properties. One such example is that of Mexican widow Doña María Paulín y Aguirre, who in the late 18th century owned her deceased husband’s store, as well as two factories, all of which were worth tens of thousands of pesos. María Magdalena de Mérida from Venezuela considerably expanded her husband’s estate after his death. These were significant feats in a patriarchal society, but did not necessarily dispel hegemonic attitudes towards the status of widowhood.

Despite the stigma associated with remaining a widow, women were expected to fulfill proper rituals of widowhood and not rush into marriage. There are many examples of rules, for example, that specified how and for how long women were to remain in the previously discussed luto, but which stipulated nothing regarding widower’s clothing, given that men’s luto was much less rigorous and lasted less time. In the early 19th century, the social convention was still that women were to wait a minimum of a year and nine months before remarrying. Throughout 19th century Mexico, a “rigorous luto” of one year and six weeks was expected of a widow, and women in Chile --and presumably elsewhere-- were “judged severely” if they did not properly follow mourning customs. One account of luto in Chile lays out three phases layed out in years: in the first year, the widow was to wear opaque black and refrain from mourning jewelry with the exception of chains, then, in the second year, “less severe fabrics” were acceptable along with modest mourning jewelry, and in the third year, colors like gray and mauve might be admissible. There was thus a performative demand of widows, in which they had to demonstrate a kind of fidelity even after the marriage had ended. In essence, this was a form of control that was enforced in social spheres in addition to being sanctioned explicitly and implicitly through both the state and the Church. José Campeche’s Portrait of a woman in mourning exemplifies this performative standard.
Carolina Stutz

Fig. 2

This well-to-do widow in Puerto Rico is dressed in a modest *luto*, adorned with a mourning broach depicting the Virgin Mary, and is located safely in the domestic sphere. Her dignified expression displays the proper emotional composure that is expected of her. She is also conforming to the widow’s “social obligation of elegance,” attributed particularly to the high ranks of society, the women of which followed the latest trends in mourning dress and went to shops like Santiago’s *El Manto Elegante*, or The Elegant Cloak. The commercial activity of elite widows in 19th century Latin America mirrors that of Spain’s in the same period, in which fashionable *luto* materials were often depicted in newspaper advertisements or fashion magazines (See Appendix, Fig. 3). Not only were widows pressured by the state and Church to perform *luto* and widowhood in particular ways, but they faced an internal class, or rank, pressure to conform to localized standards of widow self-presentation. Widows thus had to present themselves in the most dignified light as possible while having a status that fundamentally could not be fixed.

A third contradiction in 19th century Latin American expectations about mourning appears in the world of funerals and graves. Women had traditionally been barred from attending funerals and funeral processions (e.g., in the late 18th century, bishop of Buenos Aires Manuel Antonio de la Torre prohibited women from funerals because of the presence of “lloronas” and his belief that women could not contain their emotions), though these rules decreased during the 19th century. Women’s lack of presence in funerals in the 19th century is nevertheless documented, and stands in contrast to their frequent visibility in certain funeral related contexts, such as in the tending of graves. In this way, the legacy of invisibilizing women in mourning practices endured and existed in tension with the call

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that women contribute to funerary rituals and perhaps even perform emotional labor for the community.

In Chile, while women were “indeed present at festivities for All Souls’ Day at the Cementerio General,” they were excluded from burials, presumably in the same cemetery. Especially at the beginning of the 19th century, aristocratic women in Chile were neither allowed to participate in funeral processions nor in services. They seemed to sometimes have been denied entry into cemeteries as well. The lack of women in these sites is further corroborated by their absence in photographs. These forms of invisibilization fit into the cultural shift from public to private mourning, discussed earlier, whereby women’s emotional processes of a death were encouraged to occur in enclosed, domestic spaces. In other words, their presence at funerals might disrupt public order and proper conduct.

This ideology, which guarded women from the public gaze --and, in a sense, guarded women’s own eyes upon the public-- is quite contrary to another trend of the time, namely, women being encouraged to engage in the post-funeral honoring of the dead. They were often charged with maintaining the “cleanliness and decoration of the tombs” and ensuring that the tombs produced a “good impression.” In fact, journalists captured many such decorations by women through photographs, which were likely to be featured in the next day’s newspaper. This is one way in which they were expected to occupy a more visible role in funerary rituals. It is notable, however, that this engagement occurred “behind the scenes” and indeed after the funeral. In this way, women remained hidden and distanced from the collective processing of a death.

In the context of mourning, women were also expected to transmit “good taste and sensibility” and their presence was “an important element to reduce nostalgic bitterness or the fear of the undeniable end.” This “female affectivity,” in effect, played a crucial role in the successful mourning process. Their role as consoling presences indicates that they were catalysts for family and community healing in the face of grief and tragedy. In this sense, “what could be comforting in one context could be destabilizing in another.”

In other words, women’s emotions might be threatening at the funeral, but comforting and desired in the home. This vision fed into a kind of complementarianism, in which the men and women’s “tasks” were socially divided based on their supposed natures. As one scholar writes, “the woman represented the [moral] stabilizing element” in society, such that she “…personified the ideal of sacrifice and stoicism in the face of the very temptations to which men could from time to time suc-

135 León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana, 148.
136 León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana, 190.
137 León León, Sepultura Sagrada, Tumba Profana, 190.
Though tasking women with the emotional labor reinforced patriarchal dynamics, it also may have given women a kind of stage from which to break away momentarily from invisibilization, in which they were offered no contributory role. In any case, more than reflecting a society characterized by complementarian logic, perhaps such a framework communicates the “way people thought about women’s emotional capacities and control,” and consequently the pressing need to adequately regiment them.

Having surveyed some interconnected tensions that emerged in this historical moment, it seems as though a consistent thread was the cultural importance of “maintaining appearances” during mourning and mourning rituals, and that women played a crucial role in this end. Even opposing ideologies related to mourning (i.e., extravagance versus simplicity) equally aimed to construct a satisfying image of the self in society. The desire in the 19th century to leave behind the image of a “good death” is similarly reflective of how important appearances were. This concern echoed colonial Latin America, in which the image one projected was a cultural priority and value: women were expected to appear “decent, trustworthy, and honest,” and attire played a fundamental role in the making of this image. In their grief, early colonial-era women were held to the ideal Catholic image and standard of the suffering Mary, that is, the “virtuous example” of the Virgin Mary. Consequently, they were supposed to persuasively demonstrate profound grief, but also embody stoicism and unaffectedness. As we have observed, this ethos was critical in the 19th century, and women continued to be at the forefront of projecting the desired images of mourning. Expectations about propriety were inextricably linked with institutions of authority that sought to control the population, and while the specific meaning of “propriety” shifted over time and context, its enforcement in various forms was an essential component of life and had material consequences for women.
Appendix

Fig. 1

_Transporte de los restos de las víctimas_ (Transportation of the remains of the victims), Ernest Charton, c. before 1877. Image from Wikipedia.

Charton (1815-1877) was a French painter who lived a large portion of his latter life in Latin America, including Chile. In this image, he is depicting a scene associated with the fire that took place in Compañía de Jesús on December 8, 1863, which was occupied by more than 2,000 people, thousands of whom died. The women depicted in the front, kneeling and praying, seem to be dressed in _luto_ as they watch the bodies of victims being carried away.

(See page 8)

Fig. 2


Fig. 3

From the 19th century magazine _El Correo de la Moda_, July 2nd, 1877.

Found in Jose A. Ortiz’s “Dolor y muerte en la indumentaria española,” pp. 29.

This Spanish magazine page features various dress and hat models, among other fashionable _luto_ items. This kind of publication may have circulated in Latin American countries as well.
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Note: All translations are mine.